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1
Introduction
 
This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of 
restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is 
invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, 
but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the 
macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of 
the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important 
contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on 
neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and 
place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated 
specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the 
fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a 
similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the 
dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and 
consolidation of ‘distributional coalitions.’ 
 
1. Distributional Coalitions 
 
It is perhaps convenient to begin our discussion of institutional dynamics with the 
general theoretical framework proposed by Olson, first in his 1965 work on The Logic 
of Collective Action and, later, in his 1982 book on The Rise and Decline of Nations.1 
According to Olson (1982, p. 184), all familiar macroeconomic theories abstracted 
from the very essence of the problem they sought to solve; while otherwise full of 
profound and indispensable insight, these theories were also ‘fatally incomplete,’ 
each having a ‘hole at its very centre.’ In the Keynesian theory, involuntary 
unemployment depended, at least in part, on the downward stickiness of nominal 
wages, but Keynes never explained why wages were sticky, the level at which they 
were stuck, or the duration of their invariability. The monetarist explanations 
avoided the pitfall of sticky wages but these theories failed altogether to explain 
involuntary unemployment – or, for that matter, the existence of any massive and 
prolonged unemployment. Cost-push theories for inflation and stagflation were 
important in emphasizing the potential significance of monopoly power, yet they did 
not clarify why monopoly power should affect the rate of inflation (as distinct from 
relative prices) and why the rate of inflation varied over time.  
In Olson’s opinion, these fundamental deficiencies arose largely because 
economists failed to incorporate the evolution of economic institutions and political 
cultures into their macroeconomic theories. Excessive emphasis on individual action 
served to divert attention from the activities of dominant groups and organizations 
which, in the final analysis, were the primary determinants of ‘sticky prices,’ 
                                                 
     1 Shorter statements can be found in Olson (1988 and 1989). 
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‘involuntary unemployment,’ ‘government policies’ and, in fact, the very ‘rise and 
decline of nations.’ The central position occupied by alliances, associations, 
combinations and coalitions in the course of social evolution suggests that, in order 
to get to the root of broad economic phenomena, we must go beyond the restricted 
context of individual action and incorporate into our analysis the logic and 
implications of collective action. 
To do that, Olson begins with the basic rationale for collective action. Common 
sense suggests that rational individuals will seek to promote their own personal 
interest, but that does not necessarily mean they will strive to promote the collective 
interest of a group to which they belong. As members of a large group, individuals 
will usually prefer not to engage in collective action. For example, few rational 
consumers contribute money to consumer protection groups; most voters would not 
donate money to the political party for which they vote; numerous tax payers strive 
to minimize their tax payments the spending of which they ultimately enjoy; 
unemployed workers rarely attempt to organize political pressure groups; and many 
unionized workers would prefer not to pay their own union dues (provided most 
other workers do). This apparent ‘paradox’ between the interest of the group and the 
action of its members often disappears when the group is relatively small. For 
instance, General Motors may chose to unilaterally spend substantial amounts of 
money to promote tariff policies which are advantageous not only to itself, but also 
to the other two domestic automobile producers; or, Bechtel Corporation may invest 
in promoting an atomic energy policy which will favour not only its own interests 
but also those of other large firms such as Westinghouse and General Electric. 
According to Olson, both types of behaviour are entirely rational and the reason is 
very simple. 
For an individual, the gross benefit from participating in collective action 
commonly appears in the form of a ‘public good,’ such as a higher wage rate for 
unionized workers, a higher price for the members of a cartel, or a lower corporate 
tax rate for members of a business lobby group. Note, however, that in order to 
obtain such individual benefits, the public good must be made available to all 
members of the group and this could be quite costly. In this context, rational 
optimizers would consider participating in collective action only if their expected net 
benefit is positive; in other words, only if their own contribution toward obtaining 
the public good is smaller than the gross benefit that contribution is expected to 
generate for them. Now, ceteris paribus, an increase in the size of the group will tend 
both to augment the cost of obtaining the public good and to reduce the share of the 
overall gain accrued to any individual member. Put somewhat differently, as the size 
of the group and the total cost necessary to attain a collective good grow, the effect of 
any individual contribution on the probability of securing that good tends to decline 
and thus diminishes the net benefit an individual can expect to derive from 
participating in such collective action. Since the incentive for group action decreases 
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as the size of the group increases, large groups will find it more difficult to organize 
and act collectively than smaller ones. 
Note that the forgoing argument does not rule out the collective action of large 
groups. Indeed, such groups do organize and act, but the support of their members is 
commonly secured not with collective goods, but with so-called ‘selective 
incentives.’ In a large group, the net benefit to an individual from participating in 
collective action is usually negative and, in order to ensure such participation, 
additional incentives must be applied to individual members depending on whether or 
not they contribute toward attaining the collective good. (Selective incentives may be 
either negative or positive. A legal penalty imposed on those union members who 
fail to pay their union dues, or a jail sentence for citizens who evade federal income 
taxes are examples for negative incentives, while allowing individuals or firms to 
deduct from their tax returns contributions they made to political parties is an 
illustration of a positive incentive.)  
This and the previous considerations lead Olson (p. 34) to two basic conclusions. 
One is that groups with access to selective incentives will be more likely to act 
collectively than those which cannot institutionalize such incentives, and the other is 
that smaller groups will be more prone to collective action that larger ones. Together 
with these conclusions, the logic of collective action leads Olson to draw far-reaching 
implications to which we now turn. 
First, in every society there will be some large social groups which cannot 
institutionalize the selective incentives necessary to secure the support of their 
members. These groups will not organize for collective action and consequently will 
be left out of the social bargaining. Their exclusion casts doubts on the overall merit 
of free bargaining. The conviction that such bargaining is essential for economic 
efficiency may be adequate for an atomistic society of separate individuals; but, in 
reality, where some individuals act collectively while most others cannot, the gains 
for the bargaining parties often come at the expense of those who were left out. 
According to Olson, this simple consideration serves to indicate that neoclassical 
assumptions about rational behaviour do not necessarily imply social harmony and 
overall economic prosperity. In the context of collective action, rational action is in 
fact a major antagonistic force and, hence, even in the absence of any other obstacle, 
‘a society that would achieve either efficiency or equity though comprehensive 
bargaining is out of the question’ (p. 37, emphasis added). 
Second, the problem is greatly aggravated by the specific nature of collective 
action. While every group in society is normally interested in overall efficiency and 
growth, says Olson, only a few will find it beneficiary to contribute toward such ends. 
This becomes evident if we view aggregate growth and efficiency as public goods 
available to all groups in society. Following the logic of collective action, a group 
should strive to promote broad social ends only if its expected net benefit from such 
action is positive; in other words, only if the expected gross benefit to the group 
exceeds the cost it must incur in order to obtain these benefits for society as a whole. 
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For small groups, the expected net benefit of such action would usually be negative 
and, hence, although such groups may wish to enjoy macroeconomic prosperity, 
they will rarely sacrifice their own resources to promote it.2 Apart from striving to 
increase the social pie, the only other course of action open to small groups is to try and 
obtain a larger share of that pie. The net benefit from following this latter strategy will 
usually be positive and this, too, follows directly from the logic of collective action. 
An attempt by a group to redistribute income in its favour is likely to cause a 
misallocation of social resources and an overall reduction of aggregate output. These 
are collective misfortunes and are detrimental to all members of society. The benefit 
from redistribution, on the other hand, accrues only to the group itself. Now, for a 
small group, the potential gains from redistribution will normally be vastly larger 
than the share of the social cost the group must incur in the process and, hence, 
 
the typical organization for collective action within a society will, at least if 
it represents only a narrow segment of the society, have little or no incentive 
to make any significant sacrifice in the interest of society; it can best serve its 
members interests by striving to seize a larger share of the society’s 
production for them. . . . [T]here is for practical purposes no constraint on the 
social cost such an organization will find it expedient to impose on the society in the 
course of obtaining a larger share of the output for itself. (p. 44, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
Since most organizations for collective action are small relative to society, Olson 
concludes that, far from being conducive to growth, these groups are strongly 
disposed toward acting as distributional coalitions, seeking to redistribute existing 
income and wealth at any cost to the rest of society. 
Third, distributional coalitions are relatively slow to act and that, too, has grave 
implications. For a distributional coalition, the most contentious issue in deciding on 
a common strategy is the ‘proper’ allocation of cost and gains among group 
members. Small groups often try to solve the problem via ‘consensual bargaining,’ 
while in larger groups, where consensus is difficult to achieve, decisions are 
commonly arrived through ‘constitutional procedures.’ Both of these processes are 
time consuming, particularly when groups have crowded agendas. In order to avoid 
paralysis, many distributional coalitions tend to bypass the allocation problem by 
opting for a common price policy, leaving the allocation of quantities to the market 
or to some other abstract forces. This bias toward price fixing has devastating 
consequences, particularly for market economies, since it undermines the allocative 
role of the price system. Furthermore, because they are slow to react, distributional 
                                                 
     2 Note that the argument here refers only to group action aimed directly and exclusively at 
promoting broad social ends. While striving to achieve other goals, a small group may also 
have a positive effect on overall efficiency and growth, but this effect is only indirect and hence 
does not bear on the issue at hand. 
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coalitions tend to reduce the long-term vitality of their society. Not only do they 
make the economy less responsive to changes in tastes, technology and natural 
conditions, but they also obstruct the creative faculties of society by slowing down 
the assimilation of new innovations. According to Olson, this inherent inflexibility 
works not only to restrict the absolute levels of output and employment, but also to 
reduce the economy’s rate of growth. 
Fourth, the economic significance of distributional coalitions is strongly tied to 
their profound impact on the political and cultural transformation of society. 
Distributional coalitions serve their member by lobbying for favourable government 
policies or by colluding to alter market outcomes. Over time, with the progressive 
accumulation of such coalitions (as described below), there is hence a gradual 
reallocation of resources away from production and toward lobbying and collusive 
activities. This shift occurs also because the very activities of distributional coalition 
tend to make the legal system ever more intricate; they complicate the web of laws, 
regulations and decrees and swell the private professions and governmental 
bureaucracies which strive on them. The progressive transformation from production 
to redistribution increases the political intervention in markets, augments the 
economic role of governments and, in general, makes political life more divisive and 
antagonistic. In parallel, the growing focus on economic collusion and 
redistributional struggles creates a complicated system of formal and informal 
‘understandings’ between the different distributional coalitions. The complexity of 
these latter institutional arrangements makes productive activity more risky and less 
appealing. Finally, beyond their direct effects on economic and political life, the 
gradual emergence of distributional coalitions changes the direction of social 
evolution by slowly degrading the cultural status of productive work in favour of 
‘predatory’ activities related to redistribution. 
Fifth, the problem of distributional coalitions is far from being static and tends to 
grow over time. The process of organizing a group for collective action is costly and 
often could be initiated only in the presence of some unique and exceptionally 
favourable circumstances. As a result, organized groups and collusions would tend to 
emerge over a considerable period of time. On the other hand, customs, traditions, 
habits and the interests of group leaders work to reinforce those collusive 
organizations which have been successfully established and, short of forced 
elimination, such organizations could survive indefinitely. The combined effect of 
these two dynamic attributes is that ‘stable’ societies would tend to ‘accumulate’ 
distributional coalitions over time. 
Sixth, the social damage of distributional coalitions could have been somewhat 
lessened had these groups been sufficiently large but, unfortunately, there are several 
factors which tend to limit the number and significance of large groups. When 
distributional coalitions are relatively large, they have some incentive to make 
society more prosperous and also to minimize the social cost associated with their 
redistributional undertakings. The rationale behind this proposition is, again, 
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straightforward. Both the benefit to a coalition from promoting overall prosperity 
and the share of the social cost it must bear to achieve a redistributional gain tend to 
grow with the size of the coalition relative to society. Thus, ‘encompassing 
organizations’ which represent a considerable segment of society may often find that 
the broad consequences of their actions have a substantial impact on their own 
particular interest. Under certain circumstances, the particular interests of 
encompassing coalitions may drive them to promote the overall interests of society. 
This mitigating effect should not be overstated, however. Because they are easier to 
organize, small groups will establish themselves faster than large ones and will hence 
tend to have a disproportionate power in society. In a ‘stable’ society, this power 
differential will tend to diminish somewhat with the eventual organization of larger 
groups, but it will not be completely eliminated. Being first to organize, smaller 
groups would capture strategic positions which then become unavailable to the larger 
latecomers. Another factor limiting the incidence of large groups is the tendency of 
distributional coalitions to be exclusive rather than inclusive organizations. 
Depending on the circumstances, there is always some minimum size that a 
distributional coalition must reach before it can achieve its goal. Yet, since the 
redistributional gain available for the group is usually given, any further enlargement 
of the group beyond that minimum will only serve to diminish the distributive shares 
of existing members. Furthermore, by adding new members, the group may find it 
more difficult to agree and act collectively. Thus, once they are sufficiently large, 
distributional coalitions will seek to restrict the size of their own membership and, 
hence, narrow coalitions will rarely develop into ‘encompassing’ groups. 
Building on the simple neoclassical principles of self-interest and rational action, 
Olson leads the reader into the seemingly inevitable conclusion that a stable society 
is intrinsically ‘self-destructing.’ While social stability is a prerequisite for economic 
prosperity, it also provides the breeding ground for distributional coalitions which 
relentlessly labour to arrest overall efficiency and growth: 
 
To borrow an evocative phrase from Marx, there is an ‘internal 
contradiction’ in the development of stable societies. This is not the 
contradiction that Marx claimed to have found, but rather an inherent 
conflict between the colossal economic and political advantages of peace 
and stability and the longer-term losses that come from the accumulating 
networks of distributional coalitions that can survive only in stable 
environments. (p. 145) 
 
Thus, contrary to the conviction of some conservatives, the fact that social 
institutions such as special interest groups survive for a long time does not at all 
mean that they are necessarily useful to society. Moreover, distributional coalitions 
are not an exogenous ‘imperfection’ which merely ‘distorts’ the proper functioning of 
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production and markets. Instead, these special-interest groups are the normal 
outgrowth of the very economic process they work to obstruct. 
The logic and implications of collective action, Olson argues, could help explain 
a diverse array of social phenomena across time and space. One of these phenomena 
is the perplexing disparity since the Second World War in growth rates of developed 
democracies. While some countries, like Japan and Germany, experienced 
phenomenal economic growth, others, most notably Great Britain, showed a 
remarkably dismal performance. Much of these differences, Olson suggests, could be 
attributed to the sweeping repercussions of dictatorship, war and occupation for the 
delicate networks of distributional coalitions. Countries like Japan and Germany had 
undergone traumatic political upheavals which weakened and in many cases 
destroyed their dominant special-interest organizations and coalitions. In Germany, 
Hitler annihilated the labour unions and the post-war denazification and 
decartelization programs of the Allied forces considerably weakened right-wing 
organizations and business collusions. The post-war emergence of labour unions was 
encouraged by General Clay who, fearing grass-root socialism, decided to encourage 
the controlled rebirth of the labour movement under the auspices of the old Social 
Democratic leaders.3 These unions later evolved into highly encompassing structures 
rather than into narrow distributional coalitions. In Japan, the militaristic regime 
oppressed left-wing groups and, after the war, General McArthur acted to officially 
dissolve the zaibatsu. This forced weakening and eradication of distributional 
coalitions gave Germany and Japan an enormous advantage over other developed 
countries which had not suffered dictatorship and occupation. With relatively little 
growth-retarding institutions, these two countries were well posited for an ‘economic 
miracle’ of rapid growth (which they sustained only until distributional coalitions 
again became dominant in the 1970s.) In this sense, victory was a mixed blessing for 
the Allied countries. The best example is the case of Great Britain which, among 
developed democracies, enjoyed the longest impunity from the hardship of 
revolution, dictatorship and invasion. The economy of Great Britain has been 
suffering from lacking vitality and slow growth, but this ‘British Disease,’ Olson 
reminds us, is a relatively recent phenomenon which emerged gradually since the 
late nineteenth century and became acute only after the Second World War. In fact, 
during the Industrial Revolution, Great Britain had the fastest growing economy in 
the world and that, according to Olson, was greatly facilitated by the relative 
openness and mobility in British society, particularly when compared with the 
semi-feudal structures which still dominated Continental Europe. Since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, however, Europe has been inflicted with a barrage of wars 
and revolutions which decimated existing growth-impeding institutions, while Great 
Britain continued to enjoy uninterrupted stability. Consequently, even the laissez faire 
regime which prevailed in Great Britain between the middle of the nineteenth 
                                                 
     3 See Barnet (1983), ch. 1. 
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century and the inter-war period was insufficient to prevent the inescapable 
accumulation of distributional coalitions and these, in Olson’s opinion, eventually 
debilitated the British economy and contributed to the decline of the British Empire.  
Other developed economies were also affected by the history of their 
distributional coalitions. France, for instance, has been subject to recurrent political 
instability which, although harmful to capital accumulation, restricted the evolution 
and accumulation of distributional coalitions and helped to preserve the 
long-standing vigour of the French economy. The Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss 
economies have attained very high per capita income levels and that makes their 
continuous growth somewhat surprising. Yet, according to Olson, these cases too 
could be partially explained by their institutional structures. Given their relatively 
stable history, Norway and Sweden did accumulate considerable distributional 
coalitions but, for most part, these tended to be highly encompassing groups which 
were only marginally detrimental to overall growth. In Switzerland, the 
accumulation of distributional coalitions has been checked by exceptionally 
restrictive constitutional arrangements which make it difficult to pass new laws and 
consequently limit the lobbying power of the coalitions. The case of the United 
States is more difficult to assess because of its size and diversity, but something could 
still be said on the experience of individual regions. By comparing the history of the 
different states, Olson found that their growth rates were negatively related to the 
time elapsing since their first year of statehood. In his opinion, the latter variable 
could serve to indicate the extent to which distributional coalitions had accumulated 
and thus its negative correlation with growth rates is hardly surprising. 
Modern theoretical language and examples from recent history may give the 
false impression that distributional coalitions are a relatively recent institution, but, 
in fact, argues Olson, the decline of such coalitions could help explain the very 
emergence of modern capitalism. During the medieval era, the economic 
development of Europe was constrained by the gripping hold of guilds. These 
associations of master craftsmen, merchants and journeymen served their members 
with typical distributional-coalitions tactics, using their monopoly power and 
political influence to advance their own interests at a considerable cost to most other 
members of society. The eventual expansion of mercantilist trade and the subsequent 
emergence of capitalistic production was conditioned, to a large extent, on the 
decline of the guild system which started to disintegrate as the process of 
‘jurisdictional integration’ gained momentum. The broadening of markets beyond 
the traditional limits of the major cities, the freeing of trade and increased factor 
mobility and, finally, the progressive centralization of previously decentralized 
political institutions, all had devastating consequences for the guilds. Improved 
transportation enabled enterprising capitalists to move their activities from major 
cities to smaller urban areas and to the countryside, where the absence of the guilds 
made production much cheaper. The freer trade and enhanced factor mobility 
broadened the market and hence destroyed the guilds’ cartelistic advantage which 
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could be sustained only within narrower trade boundaries. Lastly, the centralization 
of political power undermined the existing networks of political lobbying on which 
some of the guilds’ power had rested. By contributing toward broader jurisdictions, 
these transformations slowly stripped the guilds of their destructive faculties and 
hence turned them into increasingly irrelevant social institutions. According to 
Olson, a similar institutional restructuring was apparently crucial in many other 
cases of jurisdictional integration. For example, the continuous geographical 
expansion of North American markets in the nineteenth century curbed the 
accumulation of distributional coalitions and that helps to explain the phenomenal 
vitality of the American economy at the time. Similarly, the jurisdictional integration 
of European economies into the Common Market was so successful partly because 
the removal of trade barriers and the centralization of certain important political 
institutions deprived distributional coalitions from some of the cartelistic and 
political privileges they previously enjoyed in their own countries. 
Note the significance that Olson attaches to ‘free markets’ or ‘free trade’ goes 
beyond their presumed impact on specialization and the division of labour. These 
latter processes have attracted much attention from economists and are certainly 
crucial for prosperity, he says; but such economic processes could not fully develop 
unless free markets and trade also succeed in checking the pernicious emergence of 
distributional coalitions. That laissez faire can indeed fail in this task is perhaps best 
illustrated by British economic policies in India, where 
 
more than a half-century of laissez-faire did not bring about the development 
of India or even get it off to a good start. The laissez-faire ideology in its 
focus on the evils of government alone clearly leaves something out. I submit 
that it is the distributional coalitions, which over millennia of history in 
India had hardened into castes. (p. 179, emphasis added) 
 
Ironically, this same failure occurred in Great Britain itself: 
 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, precisely when and 
where laissez-faire policy was at its peak, Great Britain acquired a large 
proportion of its dense network of narrow distributional coalitions. It was in 
this same period, too, that the British disease emerged and British growth 
rates and income levels began to lag. (p. 180) 
 
Thus, contrary to the presumption of many economists, a lack of government 
intervention is not a sufficient recipe for economic success, simply because free 
markets do not assure freedom from distributional coalitions: 
 
As I read it, the ark and covenant of the laissez-faire ideology is that the 
government that governs least governs best; markets will solve the problem if 
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the government only leaves them alone. There is in the most popular 
presentations of this ideology a monodiabolism, and the government is the 
devil. If this devil is kept in chains, there is an almost utopian lack of 
concern about other problems. . . . The government is by no means the only 
source of coercion or social pressure in society. There will be cartelization of 
many markets even if the government does not help. Eliminating certain 
types of government intervention and freeing trade and factor mobility will 
weaken cartels but will not eliminate them. (p. 177-8) 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ‘the absence of government intervention 
(even if it were invariably desired) may not be possible anyway, because of the lobbying 
of special-interest groups.’ (ibid, emphasis added) 
The robustness of Olson’s propositions seems remarkable indeed. The logic and 
implications of collective action provide a common denominator linking diverse 
historical phenomena such as the emergence of European capitalism, the post-war 
economic miracle of Japan and Germany, the long-term stagnation of India and the 
British disease. That does not mean, of course, that all other theories should now be 
conveniently discarded. A monocausal explanation for the complex processes of 
growth, stagnation and decline is not only infeasible, but also undesirable and Olson 
is very careful to stress that his theory has no such claim of omnipotence. As he sees 
it, the problem of existing theories is not that they are incorrect but rather that they 
are incomplete. Two centuries of economic theorizing have indeed provided highly 
revealing (often indispensable) insight into most broad economic phenomena but 
that is still insufficient. To comprehend the dynamic nature of broad economic 
processes, he says, we must also look under the surface for the latent institutional 
causes of economic change. Unless we specifically deal with the dominant groups in 
society and how they evolve, our economic understanding will remain critically flawed. 
 
2. Distributional Coalitions and Macroeconomics: Beginnings 
 
One area in which such dynamic institutional insight is desperately needed but 
conspicuously lacking is the modern macroeconomic theory for unemployment and 
stagflation and, according to Olson, this is also where the theory of distributional 
coalitions gains its strongest conformation. Since Keynes, most macroeconomists 
who have dealt with involuntary unemployment found it convenient to rely on some 
notion of price ‘stickiness.’ Using a conventional diagram of supply and demand, 
involuntary unemployment is said to exist when, at the prevailing price, the quantity 
supplied of a given factor exceeds the quantity demanded of that factor and this 
discrepancy occurs when the price exceeds its market-clearing level. From this 
perspective, it is clear that, while involuntary unemployment may arise for a variety 
of reasons, it could persist only if prices remain ‘sticky,’ failing to converge to their 
equilibrium vector. Any explanation for involuntary unemployment based on supply 
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and demand must hence answer the basic question of why prices are sticky and this is 
precisely where most macroeconomic theories fail. From an overall social viewpoint, 
sticky prices are Pareto suboptimal. With prices being ‘too high’ and quantities being 
‘too low,’ there is an unrealized hedonic ‘surplus’ which sellers and buyers could 
exploit through mutually advantageous transactions at the equilibrium price. In this 
context, where buyers and sellers have a mutual interest in equilibrium prices, sticky 
prices are highly embarrassing because they indicate that buyers and sellers in fact fail 
to act in their own common interest! According to Olson, the paradox is of course 
more apparent than real and its solution lies with the logic and implications of 
collective action. 
While society as a whole could do better without sticky prices, small, 
special-interest coalitions – particularly collusive oligopolies and labour unions –
often see things quite differently. In the labour market, the unemployed are too 
numerous and dispersed to organize for collective action and that means they could 
not obtain employment in return for some negotiated wage-transfer schemes with the 
labour unions. Under these circumstances, the best course of action open for labour 
unions is to try and bloc mutually advantageous transactions between employers and 
the unemployed; and, once this has been achieved, the next step is to strive for 
higher-than-equilibrium wage rates – which of course may perpetuate the 
unemployment problem. Similarly, since oligopolistic firms cannot establish 
income-transfer schemes with the multitude of unorganized consumers even if they 
wanted to, their best strategy is to fix their prices above competitive levels and, given 
sticky input prices, that, too, leads to involuntary unemployment. 
The detrimental impact of collusive practices on unemployment is of course well 
known and has often been used by mainstream macroeconomists to explain sticky 
prices and other anomalies (see Nitzan, 1990a). Unfortunately, familiar anti-union 
sentiments and occasional references to restrictive business tactics are hopelessly 
insufficient as a basis for macroeconomic understanding. The problem, says Olson, 
arises because most macroeconomists treat ‘monopoly power’ not as an integral part 
of their theory but rather as an exogenous institutional ‘distortion.’ Given their 
excessive passion for ‘generality,’ some orthodox macroeconomists find it 
undesirable to base their (otherwise) universal models on what they see as 
exceptional structural ‘imperfections,’ and it is this very attitude which keeps the 
answers to their most burning questions safely out of reach. While students of 
economic structures and institutions have long realized the dynamic historical nature 
of their subject, macroeconomists have laboriously striven to strip their theories so 
that they could discover the static timeless laws of their discipline. With Keynes 
applying his multiplier principle to both Great Britain of the 1930s and to the slave 
society of Pharaonic Egypt, and with Friedman declaring that inflation was always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, macroeconomists were led to believe that 
their field was indeed independent of both history and institutions. This a-historical 
framework might have been valid had macroeconomists succeeded in explaining the 
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cross-section variability in the performance of different countries, or why 
macroeconomic performance changed over time, but, unfortunately, these are 
questions for which macroeconomics has no convincing answers. Some 
macroeconomists have indeed suggested that differences in national labour practices 
and changes in government policies could account for spatial and temporal 
variations in macroeconomic performance, but these ad hoc explanations do not solve 
the problem. Instead, they lead the macroeconomists who use them into a theoretical 
limbo since standard macroeconomics has nothing to say on the causes for structural 
diversity and institutional change. 
If sticky prices and involuntary unemployment indeed depend on the extent of 
‘monopoly power,’ we must deal with the dynamic evolution of such power. If 
inflation is the outcome of expansionary government policies, we must explain the 
institutional forces leading to such policies. Unless we deal with the dynamic causes 
of such structural developments, we could say very little on why some countries have 
suffered greater unemployment than others, or on why stagflation seems to have 
intensified over the last several decades. In short, a theory which relies on institutions 
must also explain how those institutions arose, and since macroeconomics definitely 
needs to deal with structure, it must also deal with structural change. Viewed from this 
perspective, the theory of distributional coalitions offers much more than a static 
explanation for sticky prices and involuntary unemployment. It may also help us 
understand why these and other broad macroeconomic phenomena evolve over time. 
Olson’s logic of collective action says that distributional coalitions will tend to 
fix prices rather than quantities as has often been supported by evidence on the 
activities of business collusions and labour unions. It also implies that coalitions will 
be sluggish and, hence, that their prices will remain ‘sticky’ for considerable periods. 
Given their delayed reaction to changing circumstances, distributional coalitions will 
be slow to lower their prices, even when such reductions serve their group interest. 
When circumstances call for price increases, however, there will be tolerance and 
even encouragement for unilateral price hikes by individual members because that 
helps to bypass the lengthy decision-making process. As a consequence, coalition 
prices will exhibit less downward than upward flexibility and, that, too, is consistent 
with abundant evidence about ratchet-like oligopolistic pricing practices. Finally, the 
incidence of relative price inflexibility across different industries should be positively 
affected by the prevalence of narrow-interest coalitions. Such coalitions are easier to 
organize when groups are relatively small and, as many studies seem to indicate, 
price flexibility indeed tends to be inversely correlated with the degree of industrial 
concentration.  
These assessments lead Olson to infer that, in the final analysis, distributional 
coalitions and not deficient demand are the ultimate source of involuntary 
unemployment. To explicate this conclusion, he points to a major qualitative change 
occurring in the way in which the U.S. economy has been responding to deficient 
aggregate demand. During the nineteenth century, there were substantial drops in 
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aggregate demand and these indeed led to recessions and unemployment. Yet, in 
comparison to the Great Depression, the declines in real output and employment 
were relatively minor and brief. The reason, Olson believes, was fairly simple. As a 
‘young’ society with an expanding frontier, the United States had accumulated 
comparatively few distributional coalitions that could generate sticky prices and, in 
this context, even massive declines in aggregate demand were quickly translated into 
falling prices and left only a smaller mark on real variables. Things began to change 
with the closing of the frontier and the great surge in corporate concentration during 
the 1890s and, indeed, it was in that very period that the term ‘unemployment’ first 
came into common use. By 1929, on the eve of the Great Depression, the United 
States had already accumulated a dense network of distributional coalitions. When 
aggregate demand collapsed in the early 1930s, these dominant coalitions prevented 
the necessary price deflation and propagated the depression. The crisis was further 
aggravated by the official sanctioning of industrial ‘self government’ under the 
auspices of the National Recovery Administration, and by the legal promotion of 
unions and minimum wages via the National Labor Relations Act and the Wagner 
Act.  
These and other historical examples lead Olson to suggest that aggregate 
demand has only an indirect effect on involuntary unemployment and that the 
precise magnitude of this effect is largely determined by the breadth and strength of 
distributional coalitions. Over time, as distributional coalitions accumulate and 
become more dominant in society, the ‘price effect’ of falling aggregate demand 
tends to diminish, the ‘output effect’ tends to rise and involuntary unemployment 
increasingly appears as a ‘chronic’ problem. Similarly, young societies, or those 
which have recently emerged from the turmoil of tyranny, revolution or foreign 
occupation, often recover fairly quickly from the recessionary effects of deficient 
demand (or other adverse shocks), whereas older, stable societies, where 
distributional coalitions had more time to accumulate and establish price-fixing 
mechanisms, experience much longer and painful recessions from which their 
recovery is commonly incomplete. 
From this perspective, the emergence of worldwide stagflation in the 1970s does 
not seem anomalous at all. According to Olson, it is simply the next logical step in a 
continuous historical process. During a quarter century of relative political stability 
throughout the western world, the progressive accumulation of distributional 
coalitions slowly reduced the price effect of recessions until it eventually became 
positive. As Phillip Cagan describes it: 
 
the change in rates of change [of prices] from each expansion to the ensuing 
recession became less negative and, in the last two cycles, the change 
became positive – that is, the rate of price increase in the recession exceeded 
that in the expansion, perverse cyclical behavior not exhibited before. The 
distinctive feature of the post-war inflations has not been that prices rose 
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faster in periods of cyclical expansion – many previous expansions had 
much higher rates – but that they declined hardly at all, or even rose, in 
recessions. . . . The startling failure of the 1970 recession to curb inflation 
was not a new phenomenon . . . but simply a further step in a progressive post-war 
development. (Cagan, 1979, cited in Olson, 1983, pp. 219-20, emphases 
added) 
 
Under conditions of stagflation, it becomes even more evident that the primary cause 
of involuntary unemployment is not deficient demand. Since the 1970s, price 
increases were usually larger than the contemporaneous fall in real output which 
means that aggregate demand (in nominal terms) was in fact rising together with 
unemployment.  
Olson’s rationale for stagflation could be clarified by separating the long-term 
change in the rate of unemployment from its short-term fluctuations. Distributional 
coalitions act by setting their own prices, but the distributional outcome depends also 
on what happens to other prices. ‘Optimal’ pricing in this context requires an 
accurate prediction of future prices, but that is not easy to achieve because coalitions 
are usually slow to act. Olson maintains that, with their tardy reaction, distributional 
coalitions will generally underestimate changes in the future rate of inflation and that, 
in his opinion, helps to explain the familiar Phillips Curve relationship between 
unemployment and inflation over the business cycle. The mechanism is fairly simple. 
At any point in time, society suffers from a certain ‘normal’ rate of unemployment 
inflicted by coalition activity. Now, suppose that the rate of inflation increases 
‘unexpectedly.’ The unanticipated rise means that existing coalition prices will now 
be lower than what the coalitions would have desired and that will cause the rate of 
unemployment to fall below its ‘normal’ level. The same process will work in reverse 
during periods of unexpected disinflation or deflation. As the rate of inflation 
declines faster than anticipated, sticky coalition prices will prove to be higher than 
‘optimal’ and that will cause the rate of unemployment to exceed its ‘natural’ level. 
Provided that coalitions indeed tend to underestimate increases and decreases in the 
rate of inflation as Olson claims, unemployment will then be inversely related to 
variations in the rate of inflation. In this context, the stagflationary drift of the 
Phillips Curve arises primarily from the rising trend of coalition activity. Over time, 
the progressive accumulation of distributional coalitions and the consequent spread 
of sticky prices tend to increase the ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ rate of unemployment and 
that makes society increasingly susceptible to depression during deflation and to 
stagflation in periods of disinflation. 
Unfortunately, this treatment of inflation and stagflation is deficient in a certain 
important respect. While Olson explains the impact of inflation on distributional 
coalitions, he leaves the more important question of how the coalitions affect 
inflation completely unexplored. This shortcoming, we argue, is not incidental, but 
stems from certain notable weaknesses in Olson’s framework which must be 
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addressed. To begin with, it is not clear why distributional coalitions should tend to 
underestimate the rate of inflation when it is rising and overestimate it when it is 
falling. Suppose, for example, that the rate of inflation is 8 percent and is about to 
rise to 12 percent. Why should we assume that a price leader such as Philip Morris 
will tend to underestimate the coming change? Is it not possible for this company to 
predict that the future rate of inflation be 14 or 16 percent rather than 10, for 
instance? Or, consider a coming reduction in the annual rate of inflation from 20 to 
15 percent. Is there any reason to assume that the steel lobby, in pressing the U.S. 
government for tariff protection, will not base its actions on an anticipated rate of 
inflation of 10 percent rather than say, 17 percent? Similarly, why should we expect 
economists working for the United Auto Workers Union to underestimate the wage 
increase needed to protect the real wage of their members? Could they not 
overestimate it instead? As we have shown in Nitzan (1990c), the notion that slow 
reaction somehow leads to expectational errors and, moreover, to a particular pattern 
of errors, is clearly unfounded. For Olson’s model this obviously means that sticky 
coalition prices no longer explain the alleged Phillips Curve. For our purpose, 
however, the problem stems not so much from Olson’s somewhat simplistic model, 
as from his fundamental assumption about coalition activity. 
The notion that distributional coalitions generally suffer from inflation reflects a 
certain inconsistency in Olson’s perception of ‘power.’ Distributional coalitions are 
portrayed as essentially rigid organizations with an inherent inability for rapid 
action. Since they are relatively cumbersome and slow to react, the coalitions are 
vulnerable to changing circumstances and hence have a strong vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo. Unfortunately, these characteristics are not entirely 
compatible with the manner in which distributional coalitions supposedly obtain and 
retain their power. Inherently slow action could explain why distributional coalitions 
are interested in impeding growth and arresting economic vitality, but it is not clear 
how cumbersome groups which chronically linger behind changing events could ever 
accumulate and sustain the power necessary to achieve those very aims. More 
importantly, it is hard to envision how distributional coalitions could become 
increasingly dominant just by responding to events and without taking initiatives 
toward altering them. As Olson himself argues, distributional coalitions will 
dominate the economic scene only as long as they continue to achieve 
redistributional benefits for their members and, in a dynamic society, that requires 
not only protecting existing benefits, but also striving to create new opportunities. 
In focusing on how coalitions react to changing circumstances, Olson seems to 
have ignored the dynamic implications of his own theory. Distributional coalitions 
may indeed suffer from and object to changes which they have not initiated; but, 
according to Olson’s theory, over time, that type of change should become 
decreasingly significant. As distributional coalitions accumulate and fortify their grip 
of society, they themselves become the primary source of political-economic change. The 
common bias of identifying change with ‘progress’ may mislead us to presume that, 
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being retardant to growth and impediments to prosperity, the coalitions must abhor 
all types of change. As we argue later in this essay, this view is entirely unfounded. 
Not all coalitions are born equal and they do not necessarily use the same 
redistributional tactics. In a capitalist economy, for example, the distributional 
success of labour unions may sometime depend on preventing certain change; but 
other groups, particularly business coalitions, often thrive by generating instability. If 
those latter coalitions become the dominant force in society, political-economic 
change will increasingly reflect their own actions and, in that context, care must be 
taken not to interpret coalition initiatives as ‘responses.’ 
These comments help to illuminate Olson’s inadequate treatment of inflation. As 
we have claimed earlier, his basic assumption whereby inflation creates ‘suboptimal’ 
distributional outcomes for the coalitions, is logically unsound and hence 
undermines the consistency of his Phillips-Curve model. That, however, is hardly the 
main point. The more significant implication of that assumption concerns not the 
effect of inflation on unemployment, but the cause of inflation itself. In arguing that 
distributional coalitions suffer from their slow response to inflation, Olson effectively 
suggests that those coalitions could not be the primary source of inflation and this is 
where the problem lies. Given this starting point, it is of course quite logical to focus 
on unemployment from which the coalitions benefit, and to neglect inflation from 
which they lose. From this perspective, there is certainly no need for a specific theory 
of inflation and, indeed, Olson makes no suggestion that the phenomenon may be 
somehow related to the evolution and activities of distributional coalitions. These 
presumptions are unacceptable, however. Inflation is neither a natural phenomenon, 
nor is it an exogenously inflicted ‘disease’ coming from the outside of society. It is a 
social process propagated by social institutions and, as such, we have no reason to 
assume it is independent from distributional coalitions. To suppose that, despite 
being the primary institutional force in society, distributional coalitions merely ‘react’ 
to inflation does not seem like a very plausible point of departure. The contention 
that distributional coalitions affect economic fluctuations, productivity and long-term 
growth – but leave no mark on inflation – requires some convincing theoretical and 
empirical evidence; it certainly cannot be taken as a basic truism. 
Olson’s concentration on the ‘real’ variables of growth and unemployment and 
his disregard for the ‘nominal’ process of inflation may also have additional, deeper 
roots. While he ridicules Keynes’ and Friedman’s claim for generality, his own 
theory seems no less ambitious. It presents distributional coalitions as a universal 
institution which tends to develop in every stable society, from Babylonia and 
Byzantium, through China and India, to Great Britain, the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Olson is, of course, careful to emphasize that those narrow-interest 
groups are unique to the historical context in which they emerge and operate; but 
given the professed breadth of his theory, he also insists that, underneath this 
heterogeneity, there lies a single unifying principle; namely, that all coalitions seek a 
redistributional gain and that they do so by inflicting a substantial loss on society. 
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Moreover, the coalitions’ gain and society’s losses are assumed to be qualitatively 
identical. Since both isolated individuals and organized groups are presumably driven 
by the same hedonic goal of utility maximization, the benefits for the coalitions and 
the cost for society could be denominated in the same universal units of ‘purchasing 
power’ (see the diagram on page 198 of Olson’s 1982 book). This reliance on 
utilitarian principles could not be entirely accidental. Beyond being consistent with 
Olson’s neoclassical leanings, it is also crucial to support his claim for historical 
generality. Distributional coalitions are said to be a natural outgrowth of every stable 
society and, within Olson’s framework, the hedonic quest for material gain appears 
as the only common denominator which could bridge the vast differences existing 
between slavery, feudalism, mercantilism, capitalism and socialism. Unfortunately, 
generality is not always useful, as Olson himself aptly pointed out. By specifying the 
logic of collective action in ‘timeless,’ a-historic terms, Olson fell into the same 
methodological trap against which he warned his fellow economists. Being based on 
universal principles, the theory of distributional coalitions seems well suited to 
explain the ‘real’ phenomenon of growth and decline because these categories are 
presumably denominated in material terms common to every society; the theory is 
too general, however, for dealing with the ‘nominal’ phenomenon of inflation since 
that process is unique to monetary economies. 
While price movements have probably occurred since the early appearance of 
markets, inflation emerged as a broadly based process only as economic activity 
became increasingly denominated in monetary terms. The great European inflation 
of the sixteenth century began after the discovery of America and the consequent 
outflow of silver and gold, but it is highly doubtful that this inflation would have 
happened without the concurrent emergence of European capitalism. Such a broad, 
macroeconomic inflation certainly could not have occurred earlier, in the middle ages 
for example, when more than 95 percent of the population were living of the land, 
under an autarkic system of feudal institutions. With only limited, mostly barter 
exchange, it is clearly meaningless to talk about a ‘comprehensive increase in money 
prices.’ An inflationary increase in money prices could constitute a significant 
phenomenon only in a predominantly monetary economy and it is indeed hardly 
surprising that the first theory of inflation – The Quantity Theory of Money – did not 
precede capitalism. 
Olson suggested that the birth of capitalism was marked by the decline of 
medieval distributional coalitions. In his opinion, manufacturing and trade started to 
flourish as society was slowly liberated from the redistributional shackles imposed by 
the guilds. Yet the death of old distributional coalitions did not at all diminish the 
extent of redistribution. According to alternative interpretations (such as Galbraith, 
1975, pp. 10-13, for example), capitalism was in fact conceived in an unprecedented 
massive redistribution of income from wages to profits and the chief vehicle for that 
process was no other than inflation. This link between inflation and redistribution 
does not necessarily imply a parallel link between inflation and distributional 
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coalitions, but it certainly does not preclude it. What seems clear, however, is that in 
order to investigate the potential relationship between distribution coalitions and 
inflation, we must abandon some of Olson’s historical generalities and focus directly 
on capitalism. 
 
3. Industry and Business 
 
The first and probably only political-economist to view inflation as stemming directly 
from the evolution of distributional coalitions was Thorstein Veblen. Writing at the 
turn of the century, his analysis was markedly different from the dominant 
theoretical vogue of his time. While the neoclassicists searched for harmony of 
interests as the means and ends of economic activity, Veblen sought to unravel the 
antagonistic cultural traits which moved human history. In his opinion, society was 
governed not by a universal drive for hedonic pleasure, but rather by a conflicting 
duality of creativity and destructiveness which coexisted in human nature. With the 
rise of capitalism, this duality has slowly manifested itself through a growing 
demarcation between ‘industry’ and ‘business.’ The ‘instinct of workmanship,’ that 
combination of creative curiosity and a basic desire for human progress, thrived 
within the material and technological processes of the ‘industrial system.’ The 
inherent urge to acquire power and dominate others, on the other hand, revealed 
itself in the institutions of property and authority governed by the principles of 
‘business enterprise.’ Gradually, as capitalism developed, the requirements of 
industry became increasingly incompatible with the needs of business and that 
brought the conflict between productivity and authority, or between workmanship 
and ownership, into the centre-stage. In the twentieth century, with the emerging 
‘new order’ of big business, the conflict has culminated in the stagflationary growth 
of massive distributional coalitions. The larger use of credit fostered a rapid drive 
toward corporate concentration, and with the industrial system being ‘inordinately 
productive,’ the newly-formed coalitions of ‘absentee owners’ could sustain and 
expand only with persisting inflation and chronic stagnation.  
Veblen’s pioneering analysis of ownership sparked considerable interest in 
modern market structures; yet, interestingly, his profound insight into the interaction 
between ownership and inflation received little or no attention at all. In some 
respects, it appears as if this critical part of his theorizing was transparent and left no 
mark on its readers, at least on those who dealt with inflation. It is true that Veblen 
was sometimes vague in his formulations and that he zealously refrained from any 
formal ‘modelling’; but as we demonstrate in the following sections, his analytical 
framework for inflation and restructuring rested on a logically consistent basis which 
remained remarkably relevant throughout the twentieth century. 
The exceptional vitality of Veblen’s analyses stems in large part from his 
emphasis on processes. He examined not machine production, but the machine 
process; his analysis of capital was focused on the processes of capitalization and 
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recapitalization; he was preoccupied not so much with prevailing institutions of 
ownership and power, as with their historical evolution; and he dealt not so much 
with prices, as with the inflationary process. In his work, Veblen always went beyond 
the static perspective for economic structure, seeking to explore the dynamic 
processes of restructuring. And so although his writings were anchored in his own 
time and elucidated with contemporary examples, they nevertheless seem ‘timeless’ 
and remain illuminating even after almost a century of capitalist development. 
The basis underlying Veblen’s approach to inflation and restructuring was the 
fundamental distinction between industry and business. The industrial sphere 
constituted the material and technological framework of capitalism. When 
considered in isolation of contemporary business institutions, the ultimate purpose of 
industry, its raison d’être, was an ever-growing quantity and quality of produced 
goods and services. The methods and aims of industrial production were dominated 
by the so-called ‘machine process.’ According to Veblen, the machine process 
involved more than the simple employment of machines; more broadly, it existed 
‘[w]herever manual dexterity, the rule of thumb and the fortuitous conjunctures of 
seasons have been supplanted by a reasoned procedure on the basis of a systematic 
knowledge of the forces employed . . . even in the absence of intricate mechanical 
contrivances’ (1904, p. 6).  
Although machines were operated by individual employees working for 
individual firms, the machine process was essentially a communal activity, for two 
basic reasons. Firstly, modern industrial production was contingent on what Veblen 
called the ‘technological heritage’ of society. Technical knowledge of ways and 
means was obviously embedded in individuals, but the development and use of such 
individual knowledge already presupposed a general body of ‘community 
knowledge’ grounded in the ‘accumulated wisdom of the past’ (1908b, pp. 326-29). 
‘Evidently,’ wrote Veblen (1923, p. 64), ‘the state of industrial arts is of the nature of 
a joint stock, worked out, held, carried forward, and made use of by those who live 
within the sweep of the industrial community. In this bearing the industrial 
community is a joint going-concern.’ Secondly, with the advancement of this 
technological heritage, production activities grew not only more complicated but also 
more interdependent and, consequently, the machine process became something 
more than a simple juxtaposition of separate productive undertakings: 
 
No one of the mechanical processes carried by the use of a given outfit of 
appliances is independent of other processes going on elsewhere. Each 
draws upon and presupposes the proper working of many other processes of 
a similarly mechanical character. None of the processes in the mechanical 
industries is self-sufficing. Each follows some and precedes other processes 
in an endless sequence, into which each fits and to the requirements of 
which each must adapt its own working. The whole concert of industrial 
operations is to be taken as a machine process, made up of interlocking detail 
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processes, rather than as a multiplicity of mechanical appliances each doing 
its particular work in severalty. This comprehensive industrial process draws 
into its scope and turns to account all branches of knowledge that have to do 
with the material sciences, and the whole makes more or less delicately 
balanced complex of sub-processes. (1904, pp. 7-8, emphasis added) 
 
Given this growing interdependency of both knowledge and processes, the efficiency 
of industrial production increasingly came to hinge on synchronization and 
standardization. There was a continuous pressure toward an interstitial adjustment 
of input and output flows between suppliers and buyers and a constant movement 
toward greater standardization of both production lines and consumption needs.4 As 
a highly integrated system, industrial production was strongly disposed toward 
elaborate planning and close cooperation. Ultimately, it called for ‘solidarity in the 
administration of any group of related industries’ and, more generally, ‘for solidarity 
in the management of the entire industrial traffic of the community’ (1904, p. 17). 
The principles of business differed from the practices of industry, both in 
methods and goals. Business enterprise meant investment for profit. It proceeded 
through purchase and sale toward the ulterior end of accumulated pecuniary wealth. 
While industry was a process of production, business was a matter of ownership. 
Whereas in the industrial sphere production was carried by the instinct of 
workmanship, in the business sphere ownership was manifested through the faculties 
of power. Where industrial activity required integration, cooperation and planning 
throughout society, business enterprise spelled conflict and antagonism among 
owners and a cleavage running between businessmen on one side, and the 
underlying population of working consumers on the other. These profound 
differences were crystallized into two different ‘languages.’ Unlike industrial activity, 
business traffic and business achievements were counted not in terms of some 
tangible, material units, but rather in strictly pecuniary terms: 
 
The all-dominating issue in business is the question of gain and loss. Gain 
and loss is a question of accounting, and the accounts are kept in terms of 
the money unit, not in terms of livelihood, nor in terms of serviceability of 
the industrial and commercial plants. For business purposes, and so far as 
                                                 
     4 Galbraith’s later attack on ‘consumer sovereignty’ and his notion of the ‘revised sequence’ 
closely resemble Veblen’s views on the subject: ‘The frequency, duration, intensity, grade, and 
sequence [of consumed goods and services] are not, in the main, matters for the free discretion 
of the individuals who participate. Throughout the scheme of life of that portion of mankind 
that clusters about the centres of modern culture the industrial process makes itself felt and 
enforces a degree of conformity to the canon of accurate quantitative measurement’ and ‘those 
who would benefit by the advantages offered must adapt their schedule of wants and the 
disposition of their time and effort’ (Veblen, 1904, p. 14). 
  
 
 
 
 
21
the business man habitually looks into the matter, the last term of all 
transactions is their outcome in money values (1904, p. 84) 
 
Economists caught in a pre-capitalist habit of thinking have long struggled to reduce 
business magnitudes to ‘real’ utilitarian terms but, according to Veblen, such efforts 
were haplessly misdirected. The pecuniary nature of business terminology was not 
just a mere accounting convention. More profoundly, it reflected the very essence of 
business enterprise. The language of utility and serviceability, Veblen pointed out, 
belonged only to the tangible realm of industry and had nothing to do with the 
reality of business enterprise: 
 
In all these civilized countries where the price system has gone into effect 
men count their wealth in money-values. So much so that by settled habit, 
induced by long and close application to the pursuit of net gain in terms of 
price, men have come to the conviction that money-values are more real and 
substantial than any of the material facts in this transitory world. So much so that 
the final purpose of any businesslike undertaking is always a sale, by which 
the seller comes in for the price of his goods; and when a person has sold his 
goods, and so becomes in effect a creditor by that much, he is said to have 
‘realized’ his wealth, or to have ‘realized’ his holdings. In the business world 
the price of things is a more substantial fact than the things themselves. (1923, pp. 
88-9, emphases added) 
 
All of this seemed to confirm that modern economic activity involved not one, but 
two distinct ‘realities’: one in which material facts were denominated in terms of 
heterogeneous units of input and output, and another where all substantial facts 
where incarnated in the universal category of money values.5 
This fundamental distinction carries far-reaching implications for our study of 
inflation. Note that, in the most general sense, the ‘overall price level’ could be seen 
as the ratio between aggregate money values in the business sphere and the congeries 
                                                 
     5 At first sight, this distinction between industrial and business principles may resemble 
Marx’s two modes of circulation. Industrial activity could be viewed as driven toward 
augmenting use value through a simple circulation (C-M-C’), whereas business enterprise 
might be perceived as an expanded circulation of exchange values (M-C-M’). This apparent 
similarity is deceiving, however. While Marx differentiated between simple and expanded 
circulation, he (and Marxists ever since) still tried to bring them back into a common 
denominator of labour values. For Veblen, on the other hand, there was a complete separation 
between industrial output and business values. Furthermore, as an integrated ‘community 
activity,’ industrial production could not be decomposed into separate ‘factor contributions’ 
and certainly could not be reduced to units of ‘abstract labour.’ And finally, in the new order 
of big business, prices reflected not competitive forces but distributional powers. As we argue 
below, these considerations served to eliminate the so-called ‘transformation problem’ (of 
converting values to prices) before it even arose. 
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of commodities produced in the industrial sphere. Although Veblen did not address 
this point explicitly, his dual framework clearly implies that the category of ‘price’ is 
neither an industrial magnitude, nor a business variable. Rather than belonging to 
either business or industry, commodity prices in fact constitute the ultimate link 
between these two spheres of activity. Veblen, much like the eminent classical 
political-economists before him, looked for the fundamental social causes behind the 
appearance of prices and inflation. If we interpret his framework in this light, we 
could say that, at any one time, the overall price level is much like a hieroglyph, a 
general code reflecting the underlying relationship between business and industry.6 
Following this logic, it then turns out that changes in the aggregate price level which 
we habitually perceive as commodity ‘price-inflation’ (or ‘price-deflation’) are in fact 
the universal image of an underlying dynamic interaction between the sphere of 
business and the realm of industry. In the specific context of mature capitalism, 
inflation becomes increasingly dependent on the ever-changing institution of 
absentee ownership and on the evolving forces of industrial creativity, and it is the 
interaction between these two pivotal processes which must be placed at the focus of 
our inflation analysis. 
What was the nature of relationship between industry and business according to 
Veblen? When considered solely on its own terms, industrial activity was defined in 
terms of workmanship, cooperation, standardization and planning; yet, in practice, 
these aspects exerted only a secondary impact on the conduct of industry. In 
capitalism, industry was carried not for the purpose of serviceability and livelihood, 
but for profit and, in that context, the industrial system was subordinated to business 
ends. With capitalist development, ‘those elements in the industrial world that take 
the initiative and exert a far-reaching coercive guidance in matters of industry go to 
their work with a view to profits on investment, and are guided by the principles and 
exigencies of business’ (1904, p. 2). On the whole, wrote Veblen (1904, p. 26), 
‘[i]ndustry is carried on for the sake of business, and not conversely,’ and this 
particular line of dependency dominated the way in which modern capitalism 
evolved and functioned.  
Now, while it might not be entirely clear at first sight, this view, whereby 
business aims dominated industrial activity, in fact inverted a conventional line of 
economic reasoning. Note that being a quest for profit, business enterprise was 
essentially a claim on earnings. It was wholly and only an act of distribution. 
Commodities against which profits constituted an effectual claim were created 
                                                 
     6 This may seem reminiscent of Marx’s discussion of the social code embedded in labour values: 
‘Value . . . does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that 
converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. . . . The determination of the magnitude of 
value by labour-time is therefore a secret, hidden under the apparent fluctuations in the 
relative values of commodities’ (Marx, 1906, Vol. 1, pp. 85-7). Yet, as we already noted and 
will further demonstrate below, Veblen’s framework differed from Marx’s analysis in certain 
fundamental respects. 
  
 
 
 
 
23
elsewhere, in the industrial sphere of activity. Yet, given that industry was carried for 
the sake of business, it followed that, contrary to popular convictions, the primary 
line of causality ran not from production to distribution, but from distribution to 
production! From this perspective it was then clear that, in order to understand the 
fundamental processes of capitalism, our inquiry must start not from the realm of 
industry, but from the sphere of distribution. 
Contrary to the neoclassical theory of marginal productivity promoted by his 
teacher J.B. Clark, Veblen maintained that the distribution of income had nothing to 
do with ‘factor productivity,’ simply because economic inputs did not possess any 
individual productivity to begin with. As we already noted, Veblen viewed industrial 
activity as an integrated community process in which the ‘technological heritage’ of 
society played the paramount role. In his opinion, ‘technology,’ or the ‘immaterial 
equipment’ of society as he also called it, was not just another factor of production 
which supplemented ‘land,’ ‘capital’ and ‘labour’. Instead, it was the vital cultural 
substance which made raw materials, machines and physical human labour useful in 
the first place: ‘To say that these minerals, plants and animals are meaningful – in 
other words, that they are economic goods – means that they have been brought 
within the sweep of the community’s knowledge of ways and means’ (1908b, p. 329). 
Without ‘technology,’ the physical factors of production were economically 
meaningless objects.  
The fundamental importance of this ‘technological heritage’ could be illustrated 
with several simple examples. A peasant from biblical Mesopotamia, for instance, 
would have been useless in a twentieth-century Ford factory, not because he could 
not press a button or raise a lever, but because he would have been utterly displaced 
in the broad cultural sense. By the same token, an IBM engineer thrown into the 
Amazon forest is unlikely to survive not so much because of her physical inaptness, 
but more due to her alien cultural upbringing. Similarly with raw materials. Stone, 
which once was a prime raw material for utensil making, is quite useless in the 
production of modern tools. On the other hand, a crucial present-day raw material 
like petroleum would have been a largely useless substance in the agricultural manor 
of the feudal era. Finally, much like physical labour and raw materials, tools and 
machines also do not have any intrinsic productivity of their own. The usefulness of 
a modern robot depends crucially on the current ‘state of technology.’ With the 
arrival of a new production method, the older robot is most likely to end in the ‘junk 
heap.’ The new technology makes it economically obsolete and, although it may 
have lost none of its operating power, it is no longer a ‘capital good.’ As Veblen 
(1908b, p. 348, emphases added) put it, the ‘specific technological expedient which it 
embodies ceases to be effective in industry, in competition with “improved 
methods.” It ceases to be an immaterial asset. When it is in this way eliminated, the 
material repository of it ceases to have value as capital. It ceases to be a material 
asset.’ This logic also works in reverse. A modern factory producing semiconductors 
would have been a worthless (and, in fact, meaningless) collection of physical objects 
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during Veblen’s time, firstly, because it could not have been operated and, secondly, 
because its output would have had no perceptible use. In these and every other case, 
the transformation of a physical object into an economically useful capital good can 
neither lead nor lag behind the existing ‘state of industrial arts.’ As with the other 
inputs, tools and machines become ‘productive’ only within a historically-specific 
technological context. 
From a neoclassical perspective, all of this may be interpreted as suggesting that 
there is perfect complementarity between technology, labour, land and capital goods, 
which in turn prevents us from discerning their individual productivity. This, 
however, was not what Veblen had in mind. In his opinion, our inability to estimate 
individual factor productivity had nothing to do with factor complementarity and he 
never suggested that labour could not be effectively substituted for capital goods or 
vice versa. The real problem with ‘Professor Clark’s Economics,’ Veblen argued, was 
that, irrespective of factor proportions, production was always a community process 
and hence there was simply no such thing as individual factor productivity. The basic 
belief that labour, land and capital goods made distinctly separate contributions to the 
industrial process was fundamentally wrong. These inputs were obviously essential 
for production, but only because they were part of a comprehensive social and 
cultural process: 
 
The brute forces of the human animal are an indispensable factor in 
industry, as are likewise the physical characteristics of the material objects 
with which industry deals. And it seems bootless to ask how much of the 
products of industry or of its productivity is to be imputed to these brute 
forces, human and non human, as contrasted with the specifically human 
factors that make technological efficiency. (1908b, pp. 349-50) 
 
All of that did not mean, however, that the distribution of income was unrelated to 
the process of production. According to Veblen, such a relationship did exist, but its 
nature was totally alien to the ‘productivity doctrine.’ While the common view held 
that distribution was a corollary of creativity, Veblen maintained it was a 
consequence of ‘sabotage.’ Whereas the customary perception was that income 
stemmed from the productive contribution of an input, Veblen suggested that it was in 
fact related to the potential damage the owner of that input could inflict on the 
industrial process. It is this ‘negative’ relationship between production and 
distribution which we now turn to explore. 
 
4. Ownership, Earnings and Capital 
 
Veblen addressed the question of ownership as belonging to the realm of social 
norms. Although the modern institution of private ownership appeared as an 
unassailable ‘fact,’ it was in essence a convention, a habit of thinking which has 
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slowly developed and crystallised into an unquestionable legal structure. Writing 
within the conventional framework of their own epoch, economists have seldom 
doubted (at least not until the twentieth century) the basic belief that ownership was 
grounded in productivity: 
 
This is taken, without reflection or question, to be the legitimate basis of 
property; he who has produced a useful thing should possess and enjoy 
it. . . . The main position is scarcely questioned, that in the normal case 
wealth is distributed in proportion to – and in some cogent sense because 
of – the recipient’s contribution to the product. (1898, p. 32) 
 
The roots of this conventional reasoning were so deep that they even transcended the 
wide divide between radical and conservative economists. For both sides in the 
economic debate, the ultimate justification for actual or desired ownership was the 
creative faculties of the owner: 
 
With the socialists it has served as the ground of their demand that the 
laborer should receive the full product of this labor. To classical economists 
the axiom has, perhaps, been as much trouble as it has been worth. It has 
given them no end of bother to explain how the capitalist is the ‘producer’ of 
the goods that pass into his possession, and how it is true that the laborer 
gets what he produces. (ibid.) 
 
Over time, with the development of industry and the consolidation of capitalist 
institutions, the notion of ownership-by-creativity gained the ultimate status of a 
‘Natural Right’ conferred by a coercive ‘Order of Nature.’ Gradually, it has risen 
above criticism and assumed a nearly axiomatic status, becoming not only a 
dominating principle of law, but also an integral part of the ‘common sense.’ These 
observations, of course, were concerned only with the conventional status of 
ownership. Viewed as a habit of thinking, the Natural Right of Ownership was 
obviously an undisputable social fact. From an analytical perspective, however, the 
question of whether or not ownership was based on productivity was open to serious 
doubts: 
 
This natural-rights theory of property makes the creative effort of an 
isolated, self sufficing individual the basis of the ownership vested in him. In 
so doing, it overlooks the fact that there is no isolated, self sufficing 
individual. . . . Production takes place only in society – only through the 
co-operation of an industrial community. . . . Since there is no individual 
production and no individual productivity, the natural-rights preconception 
that ownership rests on the individual productive labor reduces itself to 
absurdity, even under the logic of its own assumptions. (1898, pp. 33-4) 
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The source of this logical inconsistency, Veblen maintained, was a persisting failure 
to acknowledge the fundamental distinction existing between industrial 
workmanship and business power. 
Given that production was always a social process, the overall productive 
capacity of a capitalist society was contingent on the size of its population and, most 
importantly, on the state of industrial arts. Examined from this broad, long-term 
perspective, stated Veblen (1923, p. 65) ‘[t]angible assets, considered simply as 
material objects, are inert, transient and trivial, compared with the abiding efficiency 
of that living structure of technology that has created them and continues to turn 
them to account.’ Throughout history, the occasional destruction of material 
equipment and resources was usually a relatively minor inconvenience in the 
rebuilding of productive capacity. (Indeed, even in the twentieth century, when 
physical accumulation reached unprecedented levels, it took war-stricken Germany 
and Japan only few years to launch their ‘economic miracles.’) That did not mean, of 
course, that tangible equipment and resources were inconsequential. In the very 
immediate term (the so-called ‘short run’), existing capital goods and natural resources 
were indispensable to the conduct of industry and this was where ownership came 
into the picture: 
 
For the transient time being, therefore, any person who has the legal right to 
withhold any part of the necessary industrial apparatus or materials from 
current use will be in a position to impose terms and exact obedience, on 
pain of rendering the community’s joint stock of technology inoperative for 
that extent. Ownership of industrial equipment and natural resources confers 
such a right legally to enforce unemployment, and so to make the 
community’s workmanship useless to that extent. This is the Natural Right of 
Investment.’ (1923, pp. 65-6, emphasis added) 
 
Seen in that light, the causal link ran not from the creation of earnings to the right of 
ownership, but rather from the right of ownership to the appropriation of earnings. 
‘Capital goods’ yielded profits not because of their individual productivity, but 
because they were privately owned to begin with. Business enterprise thrived not on 
creative contributions, but on the implicit threat or explicit exercise of power 
embedded in ownership. The logic behind these arguments was quite simple. As a 
community joint-venture, the cooperative undertaking of industry required the use of 
tangible assets. From an industrial perspective, any withdrawal of these equipment 
and resources would have the negative consequence of undermining the effectiveness 
of industry and of cutting the livelihood of the industrial population. From a business 
perspective, however, the threat and occasional exercise of such ‘withdrawal of 
efficiency’ was a wholly beneficial tactic. Since tangible assets used by the industrial 
community were held under private ownership, the negative effect of their potential 
  
 
 
 
 
27
withdrawal on industry could be capitalized into a positive business value. In this 
context, the various forms of profit were not at all a ‘remuneration’ for the 
productive contribution of the owned assets, but rather a ‘ransom’ claimed by their 
owner for allowing the industrial system to function: 
 
Plainly, ownership would be nothing better than an idle gesture without this 
legal right of sabotage. Without the power of discretionary idleness, without 
the right to keep the work out of the hands of the workmen and the product 
out of the market, investment and business enterprise would cease. This is the 
larger meaning of the Security of Property. (1923, pp. 66-7, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, the flow of profit, rent and interest derived not from the owner’s creative 
contribution, but rather from his or her established right to forcefully curtail the 
community’s creative capacity. For Veblen, the Natural Right of Ownership was 
vested in nothing more than the vested power to incapacitate. 
This language may have seemed exceptionally strong, but according to Veblen, 
that, too, reflected conventional habits of thinking. The attribution of earnings to 
‘forceful seizure’ and ‘sabotage’ appeared offensive primarily because it referred to 
the contemporary institution of capitalism. Yet, as Veblen (1908b, p. 334) pointed out, 
the ownership of industrial capital was not a ‘fact of nature antecedent to all human 
institutions,’ but rather a very late historical innovation which has evolved from 
earlier forms of private property. Despite their differences, all forms of ownership, 
including capitalist ownership, were based on the same principle of coercive 
appropriation dating back to the initial emergence of predatory social customs: 
 
The earliest occurrence of ownership seems to fall in the early stages of 
barbarism, and the emergence of the institution of ownership is apparently a 
concomitant of the transition from a peaceable to a predatory habit of life. It 
is a prerogative of that class in the barbarian culture which leads a life of 
exploit rather than of industry. The pervading characteristic of the barbarian 
life that precedes it, is the element of exploit, coercion, and seizure. (1898, p. 
44)  
 
In itself, the institutionalization of forceful seizure has always been intimately 
connected to the technological evolution of society and, in particular, to the extent 
and nature of the tangible implements necessary to carry on production. In the earlier 
stages of social development, forced appropriation was limited if only because there 
was very little to appropriate. The technological heritage of society was manifested 
through the use of relatively simple appliances and there was no real advantage in 
seizing a bow or a spear which could easily be replaced. Eventually, however, as the 
‘immaterial assets’ of the community start to develop and grow, 
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it becomes worth while – this is to say, it becomes feasible – for the 
individual with the strong arm to engross, or ‘corner,’ the usufruct of the 
commonplace knowledge of ways and means by taking over such of the 
requisite material as may be relatively scarce and relatively indispensable for 
procuring a livelihood under the current state of the industrial arts. (1908b, 
p. 332) 
 
Historically, property rights and the principle of ownership as a habit of thought were 
conventionally settled on those material items which enabled their owner to partially 
appropriate the community’s industrial efficiency. The first form of property rights, 
according to Veblen, was the ownership of people, particularly women.7 With the 
early division of labour between hunting and domestic work, slaves became an 
increasingly important repositories of knowledge and slavery became the most 
common form of private property. The subsequent evolution of agricultural 
technology turned domesticated animals and land into the most important requisite 
of production and, gradually, their ownership surpassed slavery in social 
significance. Now, the important point in this historical retrospect was, that unlike 
the ownership of capital, slavery and the feudal institution of landed wealth were 
never justified on grounds of productive contributions. As Veblen (1908b, p. 335) 
pointed out, 
 
it needs no argument to enforce the proposition that it is a record of economic 
dominion by the owners of the slaves or the land, as the case may be. The 
effect of slavery in its best day, and of landed wealth in mediæval and early 
modern times, was to make the community’s industrial efficiency serve the 
needs of the slave-owners in the one case and the land-owner in the other. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Why was it, then, that economists who found no difficulty in associating earlier 
forms of ownership with vested power and forced seizure, still insisted that the 
ownership of capital was different, stemming from the productive contribution of the 
owner? The answer to this question, argued Veblen, was rooted in the transitory 
institutions which existed during the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. 
As the feudal seizure of agricultural produce grew more ‘efficient,’ a small but 
growing portion of the underlying population lost its feudal allegiance and drifted 
                                                 
     7 Veblen (1898 and 1899) tried to demonstrate that the primal origin of both private property 
and the patriarchal household was the early ownership-marriage of women. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that much of the Hebrew vocabulary for property and martial/sexual 
relationship stems from the same linguistic roots. For example, the Hebrew verb BAAL means 
literally ‘to own’ as well as ‘to marry,’ ‘to have a sexual intercourse with a woman,’ ‘to rule 
over’ and ‘to master.’ Similarly, the noun BAAL means ‘an owner’ and ‘a possessor,’ as well 
as ‘a husband,’ ‘a master’ and ‘a lord.’ 
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toward the expanding industrial towns. These so-called ‘Masterless Men’ constituted 
the backbone of handicraft and it was their daily experience which provided the 
backdrop for the emerging ideology of ownership-by-creativity: 
 
Out of this workday experience appears to have arisen the common-sense 
notion that ownership is a ‘natural right’; in the sense that what a man has 
made, whatever ‘he hath mixed his labor with,’ that has thereby become his 
own, to do with it as he will. . . . So the thing is his by virtue of having made 
it. ‘Natural’ ownership is workmanship wrought out and established in 
material objects. (1923, p. 48) 
 
As their name suggested, the Masterless Men of the handicraft era worked for 
themselves with their own material appliances. They were free to do with their 
produce as they saw fit; in other words, they could sell it for an ‘income.’ In that 
way, the petty trade occurring in conjunction with handicraft helped institutionalize 
pecuniary earnings as a natural extension of ownership-by-creativity. Sale and 
purchase became part of the Natural Right of Ownership and the earning of income 
was then seen as a proof of productivity.  
Yet, the substitution of a new liberal ideology of Natural Rights for the earlier 
feudal convention of Divine Rights did not alter the ultimate essence of ownership. 
In both of these forms, ownership was and remained an individual right to 
appropriate part of the common social output. This could be seen from the very notion 
that one could ‘gain’ from trade. The idea that buying and selling could generate a 
profit had no root in the productivity doctrine which traced income to workmanship 
rather than exchange. The origin of this convention (before the subsequent 
elaboration of utilitarian arithmetic for ‘consumer-surplus’ and ‘producer-surplus’) 
seemed much closer to the long feudal and mercantilist experience of gain by seizure. 
More importantly, the system of handicraft which had such a profound impact on 
economic thinking did not last for very long and, while the economic creed of Adam 
Smith was gaining prominence, the institutions on which it was based were quickly 
fading into oblivion. The apparent overlap between ownership and workmanship 
which existed during the relatively brief era of handicraft, disappeared with the 
coming industrial revolution. As with the earlier systems of property, capitalist 
ownership too was an outgrowth of technological developments, in particular, the 
emergence of production on a large scale: 
 
In the leading, aggressive industries which were beginning to set the pace for 
all that economic system that centered about the market, the unit of 
industrial equipment, as required by the new technological era, was larger 
than one man could compass by his own efforts with the free use of the 
commonplace knowledge of ways and means. (1908b, pp. 340-41) 
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The ‘productivity doctrine’ of income distribution was embedded in and dependent 
upon the existence of a freely competitive system of ‘equal opportunity’ – but with 
large-scale industry the very possibility of ‘equal opportunity’ and perfect 
competition has become technologically obsolete. The modern machine process 
required an ever-growing concentration of tangible assets which meant that the 
‘natural right of property’ could no longer be akin to the cannons of ‘natural liberty’ 
and ‘equal opportunity.’ In other words, the capitalistic development of large-scale 
industry inevitably led to the separation of distribution from production: 
 
So soon as the capitalist régime, in this sense [of large-scale industry], comes 
in, it ceases to be true that the owner of the industrial equipment (or the 
controller of it) in any given case is or may be the producer of it, in any naïve 
sense of ‘production.’ He is under the necessity of acquiring its ownership or 
control by some other expedient than that of industrially productive work. 
The pursuit of industry requires an accumulation of wealth, and, barring 
force, fraud, and inheritance, the method of acquiring such an accumulation 
of wealth is necessarily some form of bargaining; that is to say, some form of 
business enterprise. . . . Taking the situation by and large, looking to the body 
of business enterprise as a whole, the advantageous bargaining from which 
gains accrue and from which, therefore, accumulations of capital are 
derived, is necessarily, in the last analysis, a bargaining between those who 
own (or control) industrial wealth and those whose work turns this wealth to 
account in the productive industry. (1908b. p. 342, emphases added) 
 
In the early stages of capitalism, production and business were still interwoven, and 
the ‘captain of industry’ was seen as a creative factor, acting both as a master 
workman, as well as a businessmen. With the expansion of traffic, however, business 
became increasingly separate from production. The managing of production was 
delegated to hired managers and professionals, so as to enable the owner to 
concentrate on the demanding tasks of business. Gradually, 
 
[t]he visible relation between the owner and the works shifted from a 
personal footing of workmanship to an impersonal footing of absentee 
ownership resting on an investment of funds. Under the new dispensation 
the owner’s guiding interest centered on the earning of the concern rather 
than on the workmen and their work. (1923, p. 59) 
 
Seen from this perspective, capitalism meant not merely the accumulation of ‘capital 
goods’ under private ownership, but more profoundly, a division between business and 
industry affected through the rise of absentee ownership. 
The institution of absentee ownership altered the nature and meaning of 
‘capital.’ With the new order of large-scale industry, the capitalist became an 
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absentee owner of pecuniary wealth, an investor of funds whose activity no longer 
belonged to the realm of industry. Instead of being a creation of capital goods, 
investment now meant a business transaction in which the investor acquired a claim 
over a stream of money income. Likewise, accumulation no longer meant the 
augmentation of physical means of production, but rather the expansion of financial 
values. Under absentee ownership, the object of investment and accumulation –
capital – was stripped of any physical characteristics and assumed the universal 
appearance of money value. While many economists still viewed capital as an 
amalgamation of machines, structures, and semi-finished commodities, for the 
businessman capital signified something totally different. In the eyes of a modern 
investor, capital meant a capitalized earning capacity. From the businessman point of 
view, his capital consisted not of the factories, mines, railways, or retail 
establishments under his absentee ownership, but of the present value of the expected 
earnings which would accrue to him by force of that ownership. 
Absentee ownership and pecuniary investment emerged during the transition to 
capitalism, initially in commercial ventures and, subsequently, in industrial 
undertakings. The practice of pecuniary investment spread rapidly and persistently 
yet, for more than a century after the publication of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
(1776), this development left little or no impact on the writing of economists who, for 
the most part, remained preoccupied with the tangible substance of capital goods. It 
was only with the overwhelming growth of big business in the end of the nineteenth 
century, that economists finally began to catch up with reality and started to ponder 
about the business view of capital. Though even then, the notion that capital values 
represented a capitalization of earning capacity was rarely seen as a contentious 
issue. Indeed, until the Cambridge Controversy of the 1960s, most economists saw 
no contradiction between the value of capital and its physical appearance. The 
conventional view was (and remained) that there existed a causal, positive 
relationship between price and quantity/quality. In the final analysis, things were 
valuable because they were useful and capital goods posed no exception to that rule.8 
According to the classical and then neoclassical ‘productivity doctrine,’ income 
stemmed from and was proportional to the productive services of individual factors. 
From that perspective, the nominal value of a capital good should indeed be equal to 
the sum total of its future productive contributions, denominated in nominal terms 
and discounted to their present value.9 The value of ‘capital’ and the tangible 
                                                 
     8 The hedonic basis of prices is assessed in Nitzan (1989). 
     9 The Cambridge Controversy illustrated that such a computation was logically inconsistent. 
It was shown that in order to find the rate of return on capital we must first know the value (or 
‘quantity’) of capital and that already assumed a given rate of return. Put somewhat 
differently, the value of capital, considered as a capitalization of earning capacity (or 
productive contributions), was a function of earning capacity and the rate of interest, yet the 
rate of interest was nothing but the ratio of earning capacity to the value of capital, which 
meant that the value of capital depended on . . . the value of capital! 
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substance of ‘capital goods’ were seen as two sides of the same coin. In the writings 
of Veblen’s contemporaries, such as J.B. Clark and Irving Fisher, 
 
much is made of the doctrine that ‘capital’ and ‘capital goods’ are 
conceptually distinct, though substantially identical. The two terms cover 
virtually the same facts as would be covered by the terms ‘pecuniary capital’ 
and ‘industrial equipment.’ They are for all ordinary purposes coincident 
with Mr. Fisher’s terms ‘capital value’ and ‘capital’ . . . [According to J.B. 
Clark] ‘Capital is this permanent fund of productive goods, the identity of 
whose component elements is forever changing. Capital-goods are the 
shifting components of this permanent aggregate’ . . . Mr. Clark 
admits . . . that capital is colloquially spoken and thought of in terms of 
value, but he insists that in point of substantial fact the working concept of 
capital is (should be) that of ‘a fund of productive goods,’ considered as an 
‘abiding entity.’ (1908d, pp. 195-6) 
 
It is needless to say that such logic did not stand well with Veblen. The neoclassicists, 
he observed (1923, p. 59), were captured in a pre-capitalist habit of thinking and thus 
‘endeavored to formulate the new facts in terms derived from an earlier state of 
things.’ By superimposing the concept of capital on a hedonistic-utilitarian system of 
refined barter, mainstream economists were trapped in a historical absurdity. They 
were using ‘the alleged facts of primitive industry, when there was no capital, for the 
elements out of which to construct a capital concept, instead of going to the current 
business situation’ (1908d, p. 197). Clark’s notion that capital was ‘a fund of 
productive goods’ was almost a contradiction in terms. If capital and capital goods 
were indeed the same ‘thing,’ how could capital move from one industry to another, 
while the capital goods, the ‘abiding entity’ of capital, remained locked in their 
original position? Similarly, how could a business crisis diminish the value of capital 
when, as a material productive substance, capital goods remained unaltered? Or, 
how could existing capital be denominated in terms of its productivity, when 
technological progress seemed to destroy its pecuniary value? For Veblen, the answer 
to these questions was straightforward. Capital was simply not a double-sided entity. 
It was a pecuniary magnitude and only a pecuniary magnitude, and it was generally 
independent of the specific industrial function performed by ‘underlying’ capital 
goods. 
The value of capital depended on pecuniary earnings, and the right for such 
earnings, as Veblen repeatedly emphasized, was based on business ownership, not 
industrial production. ‘It is the ownership of materials and equipment that enables 
the capitalisation to be made,’ he wrote (1923, p. 61), ‘but ownership does not of 
itself create a net product, and so it does not give rise to earnings, but only to the 
legal claim by force of which the earnings go to the owners of the capitalized wealth.’ 
The earnings on which capitalization was based were business earnings, the income 
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of an entire ‘going-concern.’ In the final analysis, these earnings depended not on the 
productive contribution of the owned capital goods and not even on the overall 
productivity of the company’s industrial apparatus. Instead, they hinged on the 
institutional ability of the individual firm, operating as a business undertaking (rather 
than as an industrial unit), to appropriate part of the community’s technological 
efficiency. In other words, what was being capitalized was not the ability to produce, 
but the power to appropriate. 
The contention surrounding the link between profit and power persisted partially 
because the historical consolidation of property rights slowly turned the forceful 
appropriation of profit into a relatively peaceful process. Under modern capitalism, 
the right to profit became a common and legal norm which, in turn, reduced the 
need for explicit use of violence. Yet the fact that profit was now an accepted social 
norm did not mean that profit no longer depended on power. The change was 
primarily of form, not substance. Instead of relying on the use of violence, the 
exercise of economic force was now institutionalized through the conventional 
subordination of industrial activity to business ends.10 Under the system of business 
enterprise, production was controlled toward generating the largest possible profit for 
the absentee owner11 and, as it turned out, that could be achieved only through the 
strategic limitation of productive activity. It was in this strategic limitation of industry, 
or ‘sabotage,’ as Veblen liked to call it, that economic force was now manifested. 
Given the negative connotations arising from this strong use of language and 
given the popular notion that business enterprise in fact promotes industrial initiatives 
and productive creativity, it is necessary to try and clarify the meaning of ‘sabotage’ 
here. Seen as an entire social order, the regime of business enterprise has surely been 
far more productive than any earlier mode of social organization; yet, according to 
Veblen, this immense productive vitality was an industrial rather than a business 
phenomenon. In the final analysis, business enterprise was possible only in 
conjunction with large-scale industry, but the potential capacity of large-scale 
industry was not at all conditioned upon business institutions. The practices of 
business – purchase, sale and the institutions which surrounded them – were of 
course related to industry, but only in point of control, never in terms of production 
and creativity. From this a priori vantage point, business could never ‘boost’ industry. 
Even companies which are considered to be at the cutting edge of technological 
progress do not promote industrial creativity, but merely relax some of the 
constraints which are usually being imposed on such creativity. A business enterprise 
will certainly seek to incorporate new methods or products, but only insofar as they 
                                                 
     10 The violent use of force was never abolished, of course. Instead, it was reduced to the 
status of a latent sanction to be invoked against those found in breach of legal business 
conventions. 
     11 The drive toward the ‘largest possible profit’ is not synonymous with the neoclassical 
notion of ‘profit maximization.’ Instead, it merely denotes the subjective goals of businessmen 
which may or may not be related to the objective opportunities open to them. 
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confer an adequate differential advantage. The research and development 
laboratories of Sony and Intel, for example, have generated many more and better 
innovations than what has been actually used for profitable ends. The production of 
DAT (digital audio tape) recorders in the early 1990s, for instance, has been 
postponed (to the point of making the technology outdated) because several large 
firms could not come to a consensus regarding its effect on recording profits.12 
Similarly, there is usually a substantial lag between the development and subsequent 
introduction of a new Intel microprocessor, depending on the success of existing 
models and the threat from potential competition. Moreover, the very development 
of new technologies and products is often conditioned by their potential effect on 
existing profit and capitalization. Thus, the petroleum companies, for example, 
would be interested in new drilling technology but opposed to the development of 
alternative sources of energy, while the automobile companies would favour the 
development of manufacturing robots, but object to innovations which could 
facilitate efficient public transit.13 The common thread going through all of these 
examples is that business enterprise can and does benefit from the ‘state of industrial 
arts,’ but only by restricting it to its own ends. 
Why is it so essential for business to restrict the activities of industry? In order to 
further clarify the imperative of such ‘strategic limitation’ it is convenient to 
speculate on what might happen in the complete absence of industrial sabotage. 
Consider the following hypothetical illustration. Suppose that, in 1990, General 
Electric had ordered its production managers and development engineers to start 
producing at the highest possible rate and to continue in pursuit of that creative goal 
for an unlimited period of time, irrespective of ‘what the market could bear.’ In 
particular, these professionals would have been expected to develop the best possible 
products (rather than products that just ‘beat the present competition’), to bring these 
products to the production line as soon as possible (rather than to follow the standard 
product-cycle tactics) and to produce as much as they possibly could (rather than as 
much as the market could ‘absorb’). In other words, they would have been expected 
to utilize productive capacity to its fullest possible potential.  
Note that the meaning of ‘full capacity’ here differs from conventional uses of 
this term. Popular indices for capacity utilization, such as the ones currently 
published by McGraw Hill, the Board of Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Wharton School, consider the magnitude 
                                                 
     12 Sony was caught in the ambivalent position of standing to gain from its DAT development 
and lose from the impact it might have on its CBS Records unit. 
     13 Business attempts to control the overall direction of industrial development are well 
known. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the large petroleum companies lobbied 
extensively against the development of non-fossil fuels and even took on themselves to 
‘develop’ such fuels in order to minimize their potential repercussions. Earlier in the century, 
companies such as General Motors, Goodyear, Firestone, Exxon and Chevron went even 
further, by purchasing and then dismantling 100 electric railway systems in 45 U.S. cities. See 
Barnet (1980), ch. 2. 
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of ‘full capacity’ as representing what is feasible under the existing social order of business 
enterprise and production for profit. Veblen, on the other hand, thought of full capacity 
as a physical limit imposed by purely technological considerations. For him, it denoted 
what could have been produced had the community’s industrial efficiency, its labour 
force and its physical resources been ‘managed with an eye single to turning out a 
serviceable product, instead of, as usual, being managed with an eye single to private 
gain in terms of price’ (1919b, p. 79).14 He then provisionally estimated that ‘under 
ordinary conditions of business-like management the habitual net production is fairly 
to be rated at something like one-fourth of the industrial community’s productive 
capacity; presumably under that figure rather than over it’ (1919b, p. 81).15 
We have no comparable estimates for General Electric, but if prior to the new 
directive set in our hypothetical illustration the company operated only 25 or even 50 
percent of its maximum potential capacity, the new policy of producing at full 
capacity would have at least doubled the company’s output and culminated in 
business havoc. Markets in which General Electric occupied the first or second 
position, such as aircraft engines, circuit breakers, defence electronics, electric 
motors, engineering plastics, factory automation, industrial power systems, lighting, 
locomotives, major appliances and medical diagnostic systems, would be ‘flooded,’ 
while other markets in which the company held a lesser stake would also be ‘glutted’ 
with forthcoming supply.16 Initially, General Electric might increase its market shares 
and perhaps even its profits, but that situation could not last for very long. Sooner or 
later, the relentless pressure of oncoming goods would lead to an inevitable 
breakdown of oligopolistic cooperation and the onset of downward price spirals in all 
respective markets. Now, improved production technology could operate to reduce 
unit cost but that would make a bad situation even worse. Since the company was 
now committed to producing as much as it could, the prompt implementation of new 
production techniques would cause an additional increase in output, leading to 
further declines in prices (growing demand for specific raw materials, special 
machinery and particularly for expert manpower, might exert some upward pressure 
on unit cost, but that is likely to be more than offset by the overall deflationary 
trend). Eventually (and that could happen fairly quickly), collapsing prices would 
drive the profits of General Electric down to zero and, if the engineers continued to 
                                                 
     14 For an excellent review and appraisal of the literature on capacity and excess capacity, see 
Foster (1986), ch. 5. 
     15 An estimate of 25 percent for normal capacity utilization may not be as far fetched as it 
seems. Blair (1972, p. 474), for example, provided internal company data suggesting that, 
contrary to common views, General Motors normally utilized not 80 percent, but less than 
one half of its existing productive capacity. This figure would have been even lower, had we 
accounted for superior technology and resources which, although readily available, were 
considered unprofitable to use. These conjectures are also supported by other estimates 
described in Foster (1986, ch. 5). 
     16 On the relative market positions of General Electric, see for example Sherman (1989), p. 
40. 
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reign in that fashion, losses would start to mount. Moreover, although the 
disturbance was generated by the peculiar behaviour of a single company, the 
interconnectedness of business activities would likely drive many other firms toward 
the same fate. 
With this partial scenario in mind, consider now what might have happened if 
every firm behaved in that unusual way, allowing the ‘instinct of workmanship’ to 
determine the level of industrial activity. According to Veblen (1923, p. 373), 
 
such a free run of production, such as the technicians would be ready to set 
afoot if they were given a free hand, would mean a full employment of the 
available resources of industry, regardless of what the traffic would bear in 
point of net profit from sales; it would bring on such an inordinate output of 
vendible goods and services as to glut the market and precipitate an 
irretrievable decline of the price-level, and consequently also a fatal decline 
of earning-capacity. . . . 
 
Surely, some firms, particularly those operating in areas in which rapid increases in 
output are not feasible, might increase their profits, but the vast majority of 
companies would quickly go out of business. It appears that the immediate cause 
behind such a business breakdown was an increase in ‘competition,’ but that does 
not get to the root of the issue. Businessmen could compete vigorously and still earn 
a profit, provided that production remains subordinated to business ends. In our 
imaginary example, the collapse ensued not because of a greater competition per se 
but, ultimately, because industry was no longer subordinated to business ends. It was 
by surrendering their control over production that absentee owners lost their vested 
power to extract profits. In this light, it becomes clear why, in Veblen’s opinion, 
‘such a free run of production has not been had nor aimed at; nor is it at all 
expedient, as a business proposition, that anything of the kind should be allowed’ 
(1923, p. 373). While profits are certainly inconceivable when there is no production, 
they are also impossible under a ‘free run’ of production. Again, for profits to exist, 
business enterprise must partially restrict human creativity and livelihood below their full 
potential capacity. 
Veblen identified a variety of business methods of industrial sabotage. In 
principle (although not always in practice), we could classify these as belonging to 
one of two categories: (1) universal practices carried routinely and uniformly by all 
firms as part of their usual business activity, and (2) differential practices carried by 
only a single company or group of companies. Veblen’s taxonomy in this area was 
somewhat different; but as will become evident in the following section, our own 
classification into universal and differential practices is useful because it forms the 
conventional basis on which assets are capitalized. We turn now to consider this 
classification, beginning with its first category. 
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The ‘universal’ forms of industrial sabotage were not at all clear at first sight and 
for a very good reason: they were implicit in the ‘normal’ way of doing business. 
Routine business practices and conventions obviously made no pledge to industrial 
sabotage. An unsuspecting observer might plausibly argue that businessmen 
appeared to be interested in earning profits, not in limiting industrial output and, as 
evidence, point out that business firms normally did not try to restrict their own 
sales. In fact, contrary to the ‘sabotage thesis,’ the standard practice in modern 
business was to set a price and then produce as much as needed in order to satisfy 
demand! But was this practice as benign as it seemed? Veblen’s answer to that 
question was negative, for while firms usually did not strive to limit their own 
production, their pricing policies led to that very result: ‘The broad principle which 
guides producers and merchants, large and small, in fixing the prices at which they 
offer their wares and services is what is known in the language of the railroads as 
“charging what the traffic will bear”’ (1904, pp. 53-4). Prices were set in order to 
achieve a certain target for profit, which could be obtained only when industrial 
output fell short of its full potential, which was exactly what happened when firms 
charged ‘what the traffic will bear’! In the normal course of modern business 
enterprise, industrial sabotage was brought about only indirectly, thought the vehicle 
of profitable pricing practices. 
The link between pricing policies and profit leads us to the question of ‘power.’ 
The notion that production was restricted by the ability of firms to set profitable 
prices implied that such firms possessed a certain ‘monopolistic’ power. Indeed, 
Veblen took it for granted that, even in the absence of open business cooperation, 
modern forms of business competition were usually ‘imperfect,’ or ‘monopolistic,’ 
something which Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) started to emphasize only 
three decades later, after the onset of the Great Depression. In his words, 
 
[I]t is very doubtful if there are any successful business ventures within the 
range of the modern industries from which the monopoly element is wholly 
absent. They are, at any rate, few and not of great magnitude. And the 
endeavor of all such enterprises that look to a permanent continuance of 
their business is to establish as much of a monopoly as may be. (1904, p. 54) 
 
Veblen emphasized that the term ‘monopoly’ was used in the ‘looser sense which it 
has colloquially, not in the strict sense of an exclusive control of the supply.’ In other 
words, he used ‘monopoly’ as an umbrella term to cover the multitude of market 
institutions currently included under the modern terminology of ‘monopolistic 
competition’ and ‘oligopoly.’ Unfortunately, however, basing the link between 
profits and industrial sabotage solely on the presence of explicit ‘monopolistic’ 
institutions could be a double-edge sward, simply because it fails to explain profits 
under conditions of ‘perfect’ competition.  
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The difficulty arising in the case of perfect competition is fairly straightforward: 
How could firms which have no discretion over prices be said to exercise industrial 
sabotage? The answer to this question is surprisingly simple, provided we could 
transcend some conventional habits of thinking. Instead of concentrating on what an 
individual owner of a perfectly competitive firm is doing, let us contemplate on what 
she is unwilling to do. Take the example of mining, where world prices for many 
primary commodities could not be affected by individual firms. Could we argue that 
the existence of ‘market’ prices for such raw materials removes the spectre of 
business sabotage? The answer is clearly negative, for, even in these cases, normal 
production levels are set not by technological feasibility, but by business profitability. 
That is, the actual output of a single firm, as well as the number of firms in 
operations, are bound not by the state of industrial arts, but by what could be sold at 
a ‘reasonable’ profit. In fact, this is exactly what standard neoclassical theory has to 
say to an owner of a perfectly competitive firm: in the long-run, allow your managers 
to produce only if you expect to earn at least the ‘normal’ rate of return on your 
investment. Otherwise, you should shut down. Now, for those who endorse the 
neoclassical view, where the ‘normal’ rate of return is, by definition, equal to the 
marginal revenue product of capital, this mechanism simply assures the efficient 
allocation of resources. On the other hand, if we accept Veblen’s fundamental 
distinction separating industry from business, production from earnings, and capital 
goods from capital, it becomes clear that the unwillingness to produce for less than 
some conventional rate of return is the very manifestation of industrial sabotage. 
And, so, even though the perfectly competitive firm does not determine prices, it is 
still true that the productive activity of such firms – individually and in the aggregate 
– is usually limited by what could be produced at the on-going ‘normal’ rate of return.  
The ‘normal’ rate of profit, of course, was not a given, stable magnitude. 
Different businessmen held different views about what constituted the ‘ordinary’ rate 
of return, and their views varied across time and place. The important point, 
however, was that they all believed that, under normal circumstance, profits were 
intrinsic to the way of doing business.17 While under earlier economic systems, the 
gain from investment was taken as ‘fortuitous matter, not reducible to a stated rate,’ 
with the advent of capitalism, ‘[a]t any given time and place there is an accepted 
ordinary rate of profit, more or less closely defined, which, it is felt, should accrue to 
any legitimate and ordinarily judicious business venture’ (1904, p. 88). Thus, 
 
in place of the presumption in favor of a simple pecuniary stability of wealth, 
such as prevails in the rating of possessions outside of business traffic, there 
prevails within the range of business traffic the presumption that there must 
                                                 
     17 The classical economists went even further, making the ‘normal’ profit a necessary cost of 
production. 
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in the natural course of things be a stable and orderly increase of the property 
invested. (1904, pp. 85-6, emphases added) 
 
All of this suggested that the immediate cause leading to the most fundamental form 
of industrial sabotage was not some definite ‘monopolistic’ institution, but simply the 
unshaken belief among businessmen that the ownership of capital goods vested them 
with a ‘natural’ right to profit. For the absentee owner, 
 
[t]he returns actually accruing to him under competitive conditions would be 
a measure of the differential advantage held by him by virtue of his having 
become legally seized of the material contrivances by which the 
technological achievements of the community are put into effect. (1908d, p. 
200) 
 
The progressive proliferation of business principles turned the convention of ‘normal’ 
profit into one of the most potent vehicles of industrial sabotage. Even in the absence 
of any explicit binding arrangement, businessmen still felt compelled to restrict 
industrial activity. Their expectation for a ‘normal’ profit institutionalized a steadfast 
unwillingness to let excessive industrial production undermine those profits. 
The ‘normality’ of profits was so thoroughly accepted that the industrial 
sabotage on which these profits were based was no longer self-evident. The business 
imperative of limiting production below its potential capacity was obscured by 
defining capacity along the conventions of business rather than those of industry. 
The view of ‘full capacity’ as denoting the output consistent with the ‘normal’ rate of 
profit meant that a certain level of industrial sabotage was now considered to be 
‘natural’ to the working of the economy. This conventional view is evident in 
prevailing attitudes toward persistent unemployment. Over the 100 years between 
1890 and 1989, the average rate of unemployment in the United States was 7.1 
percent. Even if we ignore the period of the Great Depression (between 1930 and 
1940) as being ‘exceptional,’ the average for the remaining 90 years was still 5.7 
percent.18 But given that 6 or 7 percent for the average rate of unemployment was 
consistent with ‘business as usual,’ many economists grew accustomed to talk about 
such levels as representing the ‘natural rate of unemployment.’19
The significance of these propositions is far reaching. They indicate that all 
profitable firms must enjoy a certain explicit or implicit monopolistic power. If all 
profits, including those earned under perfect competition, could be attributed to the 
                                                 
     18 There were only 10 years during the entire century in which the rate of unemployment fell 
below 3 percent and another 15 years in which it lied between 3 and 4 percent. (These figures 
are based on data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, published in Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, Series D86, p. 135, and from Citibase, 1990, 
Series LHUR, p. IX-1-6.) 
     19 For more on the ‘natural rate of unemployment,’ see Nitzan (1990a). 
  
 
 
 
 
40
vested capacity of absentee owners to limit, or ‘monopolize’ productive activity by 
‘doing business on their own terms,’ we could say that the overall share of profits in 
the national income is thus a manifestation of the average ‘degree of monopoly’ 
prevailing in the economy. Note that this interpretation for the ‘degree of monopoly’ 
is more comprehensive than the one initially elaborated by Kalecki during the 1930s 
and 1940s. In Kalecki (1943), for example, the ‘degree of monopoly’ indicated the 
ability of capitalists to affect income shares under conditions of mark-up pricing. 
Based on Veblen’s interpretation for monopolistic power, however, we propose that 
the ‘degree of monopoly’ is relevant not just under mark-up pricing, but for the 
distribution of income in general. 
Let us now take the discussion one step further. Observe that the normal way of 
doing business which gives rise to the average ‘degree of monopoly’ is merely a 
reflection of all the concrete practices employed toward earning profits. Underlying 
the ability to earn a ‘target’ rate of return or to obtain the ‘normal’ rate of profit are 
the actual activities of businessmen, and these are commonly differential in their aims. 
What businessmen believe they are entitled to under normal circumstances is not 
what they seek to get in practice. The primal drive of business enterprise is not to 
strike the average, but to exceed it. Business performance is denominated in relative, 
not absolute terms, and it is ‘getting ahead of the competition’ which constitutes the 
final aim of all business endeavours. This compelling desire to earn more, grow larger 
and expand faster than the ‘others’ is perhaps the most fundamental drive of business 
and, in that sense, even members of the tightest oligopolistic coalition are fiercely 
competitive.20 
In order to surpass the average and beat the competition, firms must go beyond 
the universal methods of normal business. Doing what everyone else is doing does 
not get you very far in business. To get ahead, you must do better than your rivals; 
you must employ a differential business practice. The essence of such practices is that 
they confer on their undertaker an advantage unavailable to other firms. To be 
effective, a differential practice must not only provide a benefit for the firm, but also 
prevent that benefit from accruing to other companies. In fact, the immediate goal of 
most differential practices is simply to undermine the business ability of other firms!  
The list of business endeavours designed to establish a differential advantage is 
potentially endless, but it is useful to go through several examples to clarify their 
common nature. Irrespective of their concrete form, differential practices are 
                                                 
     20 As noted in the preceding section, business performance is measured not in units of 
‘effective consumption,’ but in purely pecuniary terms. While absentee owners may look on 
consumption as the ultimate end toward which their efforts should eventually converge, the 
daily management of business enterprise, and particularly of big business, is completely 
independent of such hedonic considerations. Indeed, it is hard to envision the Ford family, or 
a large institutional investor driving to fire chief executive officer Petersen because the Ford 
company lost money during a severe recession, but it is easily conceivable that they would 
seek replacement if, despite a large rise in ‘real’ profits, the company fell from second to third 
place among the leading automobile firms. 
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invariably institutional in their nature, seeking to alter the existing structure of 
business arrangements in favour of their promoters and to the detriment of whoever 
it may concern. For example, the hundreds of patents Xerox registered on its copying 
machines, or those awarding Bayer an exclusivity over the production and sale of 
Aspirin, were sought by these companies in order to prevent other firms from using 
the relevant inventions;21 the exclusive franchising until the late 1970s of bottling 
rights by companies like Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, or of dealerships by General 
Motors were both aimed explicitly at limiting the number of participants in those 
business areas;22 the charted monopoly over telephone services which AT&T enjoyed 
until 1984 effectively barred other companies from providing these same services; the 
concession of the Aramco partners (Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and Chevron) over Saudi 
oil closed this source for other petroleum companies; the registration of a five-edge 
star as a trade mark by Texaco or the advertisement of toothpaste by Proctor and 
Gamble help to differentiate an essentially homogenous product in order to protect 
or increase the company’s market share on account of its competitors; the attempts 
by Bechtel to influence the lending policies of the Export-Import Bank helped to 
increase the loans Bechtel obtained from that bank to the obvious disadvantage of all 
other potential borrowers, and its activities with the Atomic Energy Commission 
helped it win contracts against other engineering firms;23 the ability of General 
Dynamics to avoid paying any Federal income taxes during the period between 1975 
and 1984 (although its reports recorded profits in 9 out of these 10 years) put this 
defence contractor at a considerable advantage against similar firms who were 
unable to win such concessions;24 the voluntary quotas on automobile imports from 
Japan to the United States were beneficial not only to the U.S.-based producers, but 
also to the Japanese makers, who continued to restrain their exports even after the 
agreement ended in 1985: both the domestic and Japanese firms used the output 
restriction in order to boost profit markups.25 Despite their diversity, all such 
arrangements are similar in that they increase the profits of their undertakers above 
what they otherwise would have been and, given that these practices are differential 
                                                 
     21 Veblen (1908c, pp. 364-65) emphasized that, although ‘the invention or innovation 
covered by the patent right is a contribution to the common stock of technological 
proficiency,’ the patent right itself ‘must be considered a detriment to the community at large, 
since its purport is to prevent the community from making use of the patented innovation, 
whatever may be its ulterior beneficial effects or its ethical justification.’ 
     22 For numerous other illustrations of patents and exclusive franchising, see for example 
Kefauver (1965), ch. 1 and Scherer and Ross (1990), chs. 15 and 17. 
     23 See McCartney (1988), chs. 9 and 14. 
     24 See Wildstorm (1985). 
     25 See ‘U.S. Car Quotas: How Less is More for Japan,’ in Business Week (November, 7, 1983, 
pp. 61-2), ‘A Misstep by the Auto Makers,’ by the Editors of Business Week (January 19, 1985) 
and ‘Why Carmakers Will Mourn if Export Quota Die,’ in Business Week (February, 18, 1985, 
p. 46). 
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in nature, the said rise in profit invariably leads to a redistribution of income in favour 
of those who initiate them and on account of everyone else.  
At first sight, it may seem that, because they are concerned with redistribution, 
differential business practices merely shift income from one group of firms to another 
and hence should have no detrimental effect on industry. This neutrality is more 
apparent than real, however. Some practices, such as the ability to avoid taxes or to 
win a government contract, indeed appear to be purely ‘distributional,’ but the 
industrial effect of most differential tactics is not neutral in the least. In issuing patent 
rights, in awarding exclusive dealings, in organizing a cartel, or in establishing tacit 
collusion, the undertakers improve their relative position precisely by undermining 
the industrial activity of their existing or potential rivals. Moreover, these differential 
tactics form the ultimate basis on which the universal principles of full-cost pricing 
and the ‘normal’ rate of return seem to rest.  
The link between differential and universal practices appears on two levels. First, 
under so-called ‘imperfectly’ competitive conditions, the ability to price products 
toward a target rate of return depends directly on the presence of some differential 
institutions to prevent unruly increases in production. Now, given that under modern 
business enterprise, ‘imperfect’ competition is the rule rather than the exception, it 
follows that ‘monopolistic’ market arrangements will have a disproportionate effect 
on what is considered to be ‘normal.’ In particular, the average ratio between profits 
and capitalization prevailing under these arrangements influences the conventional 
views among businessmen on what constitutes the ‘normal’ rate of return.26 But this 
‘normal’ rate is precisely the one governing industrial activity under ‘perfect 
competition’ – which leads us to the second point, namely, that the universal 
behaviour of purely competitive firms is in fact regulated by the differential 
‘monopolistic’ arrangements existing elsewhere in the economy! This important 
relationship is so obvious that we often tend to ignore it. An alternative to investing 
in an agricultural or mining venture where there are no ‘monopolistic’ institutions is 
to buy the shares of IBM, Daimler Benz or Exxon, where returns are clearly affected 
by differential ‘monopolistic’ arrangements. In other words, a small investor will 
expect her financial investment in a perfectly competitive industry to yield a return 
determined by oligopolistic giants!27 
                                                 
     26 Capitalization, which bears heavily on the issue, is of course not ‘exogenously’ given. The 
process of capitalization is discussed in the next section. 
     27 We should emphasize that this link depends on viewing investment and capital as purely 
financial magnitudes. In other words, the indirect impact of monopolistic institutions on 
so-called perfectly competitive markets depends on the extent to which such markets are 
brought into the modern system of financial investment. In this connection, it should be noted 
that the institutional arrangements prevailing during the emergence of commercial and then 
industrial capitalism could rarely be characterized as being ‘purely competitive.’ The 
concessions, charters, certificates and franchises awarded to early commercial undertakings, 
together with the limited availability of machinery which typified the early rise of industrial 
production prevented competition from becoming ‘perfect’ in the neoclassical sense of the 
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As an interim summary, we can say that business profits are possible because 
absentee owners can strategically limit the industrial process to their own ends. The 
control of production by business is carried out routinely, either by pricing products 
toward earning a ‘target’ rate of return at ‘normal’ capacity or by conditioning 
industrial activity on the prospects of earning of a ‘normal’ rate of return. Underlying 
both of these universal business principles are the numerous differential practices of 
individual firms or groups of firms, who try to redistribute income in their favour by 
altering the institutional circumstances under which they operate. The aim of most 
(though not all) differential tactics is to undermine the industrial activity of existing 
or potential business rivals. The aggregate effect of such practices is hence 
detrimental to the industrial community at large. 
The conceptual dichotomy separating universal from differential means of 
industrial sabotage fits neatly with the two basic cleavages which Veblen identified in 
the modern context of business enterprise: the one between absentee owners and the 
industrial community and the other among absentee owners themselves. Absentee 
owners struggle over differential pecuniary gains and their struggle is carried by 
means of mutual industrial sabotage. On a disaggregate level, the distribution of 
profits among absentee owners is roughly related to the balance of business damage 
they inflicted on each other. On an aggregate level, however, the total profits earned 
by all absentee owners depend (although not in any linear way) on the overall 
industrial damage arising from the business warfare raging among them. In other 
words, business goals revolve around the distribution of profits, while business 
methods of sabotage assure that these profits will be available in the first place. 
The discussion so far suggests one primary reason why Veblen’s analysis did not 
acquire too many followers: it leads to the conclusion that, in a certain fundamental 
sense, business capital is a negative industrial magnitude! Provided that this 
conclusion is indeed warranted, it serves to undermine the basis on which both the 
neoclassical and Marxian schools of thought rest. The neoclassicists viewed capital 
as a physical entity operating in harmony with the other factors of production toward 
a mutual hedonic goal of utility maximization. Capital values represented a 
capitalization of productive contributions and hence capital must be viewed as a 
positive force advancing a common social interest. Marx, by contrast, identified the 
antagonistic social basis on which capital rested, but he too considered the pecuniary 
accumulation of capital as a powerful engine of industrial progress. Profits in the 
Marxian scheme were derived through the exploitation of labour but, given Marx’s 
competitive framework, the endurance of each individual capitalist was contingent 
on a relentless drive to improve productivity. To remain in business under the 
overriding discipline of market-determined prices, capitalists had no choice but to 
continuously seek and incorporate the best production methods. Some producers 
                                                                                                                         
word. This form of market (or something approximating it) emerged only later, as capital 
goods became more ‘abundant,’ that is to say, when capital became a pecuniary magnitude. 
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might have enjoyed a ‘monopolistic’ advantage conferred by the use of a better 
technology but, in the absence of protective institutions, their differential gains were 
necessarily temporary. The ultimate drive for higher productivity was not monopoly, 
but survival. So, although profits and capital accumulation were based on an 
antagonistic system, the conditions under which capitalists operated compelled them 
to use their capital in the most productive possible way. 
This view of capital as a productive agent is still endorsed by most neo-Marxists. 
In laying the foundations for a theory of Monopoly Capital, Baran and Sweezy (1966) 
argued that the emergence of oligopoly as the typical organization of capital made 
technological progress even more appealing, because the benefits of such progress 
were increasingly accrued to the giant corporation in the form of higher profits (or 
surplus), rather than to society at large in the form of lower prices.28 This view on the 
productive essence of capital should not be confused with Baran and Sweezy’s main 
argument on the inherent tendency of monopoly capital to generate industrial 
stagnation. The overall stagnation tendency arose not from the industrial 
environment in which oligopolies operated, but from the aggravating impact of 
monopoly capitalism on the so-called ‘realization problem.’ 
Even British contributors to the Cambridge Controversy of the 1960s were still 
ambiguous on the industrial footing of capital. Srafa’s demonstration that there was 
no unique association between the rate of profit and output per head suggested that 
the value of capital depended on the distribution of income and not the other way 
around; and this reversal, according to Robinson (1971, p. 20), ‘destroys the 
presumption that the rate of profit measures the contribution of investment to 
national income (let alone to human welfare).’ Given the conventional link between 
accumulation and economic growth, the positive connotations assigned to such 
growth were now called into question. With the ‘conspiracy of silence’ finally 
broken, the central issue became ‘the manner in which a capitalist economy 
operates.’ In other words, 
 
does the balance of power in bargaining between employers and workers 
determine the share of wages in net proceeds, or is it rather the requirements 
of profits that determine what is left over for wages from a given level of 
physical output? (ibid.) 
 
Yet, these questions remained confined to the realm of distribution and failed to 
address the possible link between the distribution of income and the control of 
industry. Robinson admitted that, until the late 1970s, she was simply unaware that 
Veblen in fact anticipated much of her claims; yet, unfortunately, even then she 
                                                 
     28 Veblen (1904, p. 242) was well aware of the ability of large corporations to appropriate 
most of the pecuniary advantage of technological progress, only that, in his opinion, that 
advantage stemmed not from technological progress per se, but from the ability to strategically 
limit it for business ends. 
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failed to identify where their arguments differed.29 While the Cambridge Controversy 
raised the possibility that capital could be unproductive, Veblen contended that, from 
an industrial point of view, it was necessarily counterproductive. 
Veblen’s broke away from the neoclassical and Marxian schemes by a priori 
separating business from industry. That separation led him to argue that profits 
required business to ‘monopolize’ industry by limiting output below its full potential. 
Without that right for a ‘conscious withdrawal of efficiency’ there would have been 
no profit and thus no investment and capital. In other words, profits and capital were 
determined not only by what was produced, but also by what was not produced! 
From this perspective, the institution of capital was, in its very essence, a fetter on 
industrial progress. 
It is essential to accentuate again the a priori nature of this position. For Veblen, 
the modern machine process was the latest stage in a relatively unbroken process of 
technological progress unfolding since the dawn of human civilization. The 
technological heritage of society evolved only from the ‘instinct of workmanship.’ 
Institutions of social power and subordination could never enhance that instinct, but 
only limit it to a greater or lesser extent. Given the scope of his inquiry, Veblen 
considered business enterprise and the price system as a transient mode of social 
organization. Ultimately, business enterprise was a consequence rather than the 
cause of machine production and, hence, could be replaced with an alternative 
system of economic organization. Whether such alternative institutions would be less 
disruptive to the instinct of workmanship and human welfare than business 
enterprise, was and remained an open question.30 The important point was that 
Veblen’s a priori separation of production from distribution implied that any extra-
industrial system of distribution could operate only by limiting productive activity. In 
other words, even if business enterprise were shown to be the least industrially 
harmful of all potential modes of distribution, that still would not turn capital into a 
‘productive’ magnitude. Within the context of business enterprise, profits for 
absentee owners could be appropriated only because ownership allowed the strategic 
limitation of output and that meant that business capital was necessarily a restrictive 
industrial institution.31 
 
5. 
                                                 
     29 See Robinson (1979), p. 60, and Robinson (1980) pp. 115-16. 
     30 Veblen’s own suggestions enumerated in the Engineers and the Price System (1921) were 
never tried. The post-war Communist experience removed some of the industrial limitations of 
business enterprise, only to replace them with other, perhaps more detrimental ones. 
     31 Knight (1921, pp. 188-89), for instance, could argue that Veblen’s notion of capital as a 
limitation of technological knowledge and industry was ‘absurd,’ precisely because he refused 
to separate business from industry. Indeed, for him ‘productivity is a matter of limitation,’ that 
is, a direct consequence of property rights. 
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Corporation Finance and the Structural Roots of Inflation and Stagnation 
 
The appearance of business capital as a manifestation of distributional power is 
intimately linked with the emergence of the modern corporation since the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. The gradual separation of business from industry occurred 
as owners became absentee owners; that is, as profits became a question of industrial 
control rather than productive activity. The ability to ‘control’ industry was 
contingent on the institutional arrangements of business enterprise, particularly on 
the extent and nature of cooperation among absentee owners. The critical foundation 
of such cooperation was the modern corporation.  
According to Veblen (1923, p. 82) the corporation was ‘an incorporation of 
absentee ownership, wholly and obviously,’ that is, a business concern, not an 
industrial unit: 
 
It is a means of making money, not of making goods. The production of 
goods or services, wherever that sort of thing is included among the 
corporation’s affairs, is incidental to the making of money and is carried 
only so far as will yield the largest net gain in terms of money, – all 
according to the principle of ‘what the traffic will bear,’ or of ‘balanced 
return,’ which underlies all sound business, and more particularly all 
corporation business. (1923, p. 85) 
 
Mainstream economists have tended to explain the rise of corporations in 
technological terms. The popular view was that the corporation was the most 
‘efficient’ mode of business organization in that it enabled society to enjoy the 
benefits offered by economies of scale. The corporation was economically rational 
and that supposedly made it historically inevitable.32 If we followed Veblen in 
separating business from industry, however, this kind of reasoning could no longer 
be accepted, simply since ‘the use of a large scale of production is a technological 
devise, whereas the corporation is a business arrangement’ (1923, p. 84). From this 
perspective, the causes which led to the rise and growth of corporations must be 
denominated in business terms; that is, in terms of pecuniary gains on investment. 
Under certain conditions, a larger scale of production might indeed be more 
productive and hence socially beneficial, but that in itself was quite irrelevant. The 
crucial question was not whether the corporation was more productive than other 
                                                 
     32 There has been very little change in the popular conventions regarding this issue. 
Samuelson, Nordhaus and McCallum (1988, p. 453) are typical in emphasizing the ‘efficiency 
rationale’ behind the corporation: ‘Large-scale production is technically efficient, and a large 
corporation is an advantageous way for investors to pool the irreducible risks of business life. 
Without limited liability and the corporation, a market economy simply could not reap the 
benefit that comes when large supplies of capital need to be attracted to efficient-sized 
corporations. . . .’ 
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forms of business organization, but whether it was more profitable. ‘To employ a 
large scale of production,’ argued Veblen (1923, p. 85), ‘is a sound business 
proposition only so long as this larger scale will bring an increased net gain in the 
aggregate price of the output’ and that, of course, may or may not be true under 
different circumstances. 
More importantly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the expansion of 
corporate finance had no immediate impact on the process of industry. The common 
view identified the mobilization of finance with the expansion of productive 
capacity: 
 
It is . . . a part of the folklore of Political Economy that the corporation – 
jointstock company – has exerted, and continues to exert, a creative force in 
productive industry, in that it draws out of retirement many small 
accumulated hoards of savings, and so combines them and puts them to 
work when they would otherwise remain idle. By this means the active 
capital is augmented by so much; which is believed to augment the materials 
and appliances of industry by so much, and thereby to increase the volume 
of work and output in a corresponding degree. This faith in the creative 
efficiency of capital funds and capitalized savings is one of the axioms of the 
business community. It is a safe presumption that no sound business man 
would question it. Savings will produce goods as soon as they are invested 
and capitalized. (1923, p. 86) 
 
But was that view at all warranted? For Veblen, the answer was definitely negative. 
What was being mobilized and capitalized were pecuniary savings, not useful 
industrial items: 
 
In practical fact, the savings in question have existed and continue to exist 
only in the form of records of ownership, commonly evidences of debt. 
What was transferred in the transactions by which the savings are taken over 
into corporate capital is commonly some form of credit instrument; and the 
transaction results in an augmentation of the volume of outstanding credit 
instruments. Whether there are any physically useful goods anywhere held 
in store back of these funded savings – physical goods which are in any 
special sense ‘represented’ by these funds – is an open question, with the 
presumption running strongly to the contrary. [By and large] . . . the saved 
up funds foot up to an absentee claimant’s undifferentiated claim on a share 
in the outstanding stock of merchantable goods at large. Any multiplication 
of such claims, or any mobilisation of an added number of them, adds 
nothing to the stock of goods on hand; it only reduces the share per unit of 
effectual claim. (1923, pp. 86-7) 
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Business investment, then, is merely a credit transaction ‘by which the corporation 
financier comes in for the use of additional funds and is enabled to increase the 
capitalization and the purchasing-power of the business concern for which he acts’ 
(1923, p. 87). These funds may or may not be used to purchase some physical 
‘capital goods,’ but even when they are used for such a purpose, that merely transfers 
the ownership of the said capital good. The actual manufacturing of capital goods is 
not a business activity; it is an industrial process controlled for business ends. 
The confusion between the act of financial investment and the increase of 
industrial capacity is reflected in common views about the nature of corporate 
securities and assets. An investor in corporate securities can purchase either bonds or 
shares.33 Business and legal conventions establish a certain ‘hierarchy’ of risk among 
these two types of securities. Bonds are considered less risky, firstly because they give 
their owner some precedence in the disbursement of profits and, secondly, because 
their holder has a statutory priority over the tangible assets of the corporation in case 
of bankruptcy. Equity shares are more risky because they provide no legal right for 
dividends and, more importantly, they are often covered only partially or not at all 
by any type of tangible asset. It is indeed customary to view equity shares as 
representing primarily the intangible assets of the firm. 
This correspondence between assets and securities is, of course, only a matter of 
informal business conventions, since corporate balance sheets do not associate 
specific assets with particular liabilities. Yet, the very habit of distinguishing between 
tangible and intangible assets seems to suggest that, from the outset, some forms of 
financial investment have nothing to do with the creation of productive capacity. The 
intangible assets of a corporation consist of items such as patents, government 
charters, legal quotas and franchises, as well as the catch-all article of ‘goodwill.’ 
These items of ‘immaterial wealth,’ as Veblen called them, do not and cannot 
‘produce’ anything. Instead, they are the institutional manifestations of differential 
practices of earning profits. If a granting of a patent generates expectations for higher 
profits, these expectations could be capitalized through the issuance of new shares, or 
an augmentation of the market value of existing shares. Similarly, a merger between 
two very large business rivals would normally not increase their ability to produce 
goods and services, but it may produce anticipations for higher profits which could 
then be capitalized with new shares backed by fresh ‘goodwill.’ In other words, to the 
extent to which corporate shares represent intangible assets, they merely 
institutionalize the corporation’s own differential or ‘monopolistic’ practices and, 
hence, investment in such equities is only an evidence of distributional power. Given 
that differential tactics commonly operate by limiting the use of productive capacity, 
                                                 
     33 For the purpose of our analysis here, ‘bonds’ consist of all credit extensions on fixed 
charges, including debentures, mortgages and direct loans a corporation receives from other 
corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Similarly, ‘shares’ refer to all credit 
extensions made with no commitment for repayment, including all forms of common and 
preferred stocks sold to investors. 
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it is clear that equity investment based on such practices could not be thought of as 
creating new capacity. 
At first sight, the dissociation between investment in equity and the formation of 
industrial capacity may seem to suggest that such capacity must hence be created by 
the issuance of debt instruments. Unfortunately, this convention, too, is open to 
serious doubts. Tangible assets consist of physical items, such as machinery, 
structures and semi-finished commodities, but they also include various ‘contractual 
obligations’ like government securities, commercial paper of other firms, outstanding 
loans, accounts receivable, bank deposits and cash. These ‘contractual obligations’ 
have nothing to do with the productive capacity of the corporation which owns 
them. They are classified as ‘tangible’ assets, but it is patently clear that their 
pecuniary value hinges on purely ‘immaterial’ arrangements, particularly on the 
solvency of the corporation’s debtors and the ability of the corporation to ‘compel’ 
these debtors to pay when the time comes.34 In other words, many of the items which 
we customarily classify as material items of wealth are in fact highly intangible in 
nature. Or, putting it bluntly, some corporate debentures may be covered with 
‘nothing but air.’ The increase since the early 1980s in the use of ‘junk bonds’ to 
finance corporate takeovers is a clear case in point. The immediate facts created by 
business amalgamations are purely institutional in nature, belonging solely to the 
realm of business restructuring; and to the extent that ‘junk bond’-financed mergers 
have a subsequent bearing on industry, their significance usually lies not in creating, 
but in dismantling industrial capacity! The conspicuous example of ‘junk bonds’ is 
perhaps somewhat atypical, yet it could be argued that, in a certain fundamental 
sense, the pecuniary value of all bonds rests on a similar ‘immaterial’ basis. 
Consider now those bonds which are indeed ‘covered’ by industrially productive 
assets such as plant, equipment and inventories of finished and semi-finished goods. 
The market value of such bonds may exhibit some positive relationship to the market 
value of the underlying articles of tangible wealth, but that in itself may have very 
little to do with the productive capacity of these industrial items. What buyers may 
be willing to pay for ‘means of production’ such as a supertanker, a cooper mine, a 
light-bulb plant or an inventory of microprocessors depends on business rather than 
industrial considerations. To a potential owner, these items are valuable only to the 
extent of their anticipated income-yielding capacity and, in general, the prices of 
these ‘investment goods’ could not exceed the present value of what they are 
                                                 
     34 Note that the ability of the corporation’s debtors to fulfil their obligations need not be 
related to their own productive capacity. Governments can repay their debts through taxation, 
additional borrowing, or by printing money and these payments could be made even if there 
are no productive increases occurring anywhere in the economy. As far as the corporation’s 
business debtors are concerned, their solvency usually depends not on their productive activity 
per se, but on their ability to strategically limit such activity toward profitable ends. 
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expected to yield in profits.35 The income-yielding capacity of ‘capital goods’ depends 
directly on the control of industry by business, either ‘at large’ or ‘in detail.’ For 
example, the maximum price for an earth-removing machine used in a competitive 
mining industry would be governed by ‘normal’ returns expected to accrue under 
such conditions, while the price of a new passenger jet would not exceed the present 
value of the ‘target’ income that a typical oligopolist like Texas Air or United 
Airlines expects to earn by using these aircraft.36 That prices for capital goods depend 
on profitability and only indirectly (or often not at all) on their productivity becomes 
evident during a business crisis. The collapse in the price of crude petroleum during 
the mid 1980s, for example, led to a ‘glut’ of supertankers. What solvent shipping 
companies (or speculators) were willing to pay for such tankers depended on their 
expected earning capacity and, given the grim business outlook, that was often well 
below the relevant replacement cost. Bond holders of bankrupt shipping companies 
hence found out that, although the tankers ‘backing up’ their debentures were as 
‘productive’ as ever, what they could recover by selling the tankers was only a 
fraction of their original investment.37 
A similar line of reasoning led Veblen to conclude that there was no 
fundamental difference between debt and equity. Even in the ‘ideal’ case where 
bonds covered only the tangible means of production and shares represented only the 
intangible assets, these evidence of ownership were both capital only to the extent of 
their capitalized earning capacity. Part of this earning capacity was habitually 
attributed to the ‘capital goods’ held by the corporation and covered by debt. The 
earnings were imputed by applying to the price of capital goods the prevailing 
‘normal’ rate of return, but that, of course, was a business procedure, not a 
theoretical explanation. Rather than stemming from the material facts of industry, 
the ‘normal’ rate of return and, hence, the very prices of tangible assets were largely a 
manifestation of the average ‘degree of monopoly.’ In other words, the value of 
bonds expressed the universal control of business over industry. The same logic 
applied to the case of equity which covered the remaining earning capacity of the 
                                                 
     35 The profit expectations and the discount rate used in capitalizing them may be (and often 
are) partially or even entirely subjective, but that has no bearing on the present argument. 
     36 Since we are talking about upper limits, our conclusions are independent of the particular 
circumstances under which investment goods are being produced. That is, even if Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas and Airbus organized into a formal cartel, the prices they could charge 
for their commercial jets would necessarily be limited by what the airlines could pay for such 
aircraft; or perhaps more precisely, such prices would be constrained by what the airlines 
would consider as ‘acceptable,’ given the business circumstances and their own targets for 
profit. In this sense, the prices of capital goods reflect the balance of distributional powers 
between those who sell them and those who buy them. The ex post outcome determines the 
respective shares of profit accruing to the various business concerns operating along the 
vertical process of production. 
     37 The effect of a business boom on the value of bonds is not symmetrical. A rise in the price 
of tangible collateral would tend to increase the number of such bonds while having only a 
marginal impact on their price. 
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corporation. The customary view was that excess earnings over and above the 
imputed ‘normal’ stemmed from some positive ‘business qualities’ which the firm 
owned through its formal binding arrangements and informal ‘goodwill.’ Yet, what 
turned these binding arrangements and goodwill into valuable assets in the first place 
were differential business practices aimed at increasing profits at the cost of whoever 
may be concerned. 
These arguments suggested that the entire body of business capital rested on the 
intangible foundations of ‘power.’ From the point of view of the absentee investor, 
business capital was nothing but a claim on profits and, as we have seen, profits were 
determined not by the industrial productivity of underlying assets, but by prevailing 
business arrangements. If there was a difference between stocks and bonds, it was 
hence mostly a difference in the extent to which business power has been 
institutionalized. Bonds were commonly used to capitalize those business 
arrangements which were more or less thoroughly accepted as the ‘normal’ order of 
things, while stocks were usually issued to capitalize the ‘singular’ business 
arrangements which differentiated between individual or groups of firms. Even this 
difference between stocks and bonds was only temporary and tended to disappear 
over time, as the depreciation of tangible assets and the amortization of intangible 
assets converted both of them into the universal form of money assets. 
Given these views on the nature of business capital, we can now turn to examine 
the dynamic aspects of its accumulation. Received economic doctrines tend to 
interpret the process of capital accumulation in ‘backward-looking’ terms. For the 
classicists and neoclassicists, capital was a physical means of production, 
accumulated in the past for future use.38 For the Marxists, capital was not a physical 
thing, but a social relationship embedded in physical articles yet, they, too, regarded 
accumulation in terms of ‘dead labour.’ The value of capital was denominated in 
units of human effort (or socially necessary labour time) spent in producing capital 
goods and in reproducing the labour force.39 Even the neo-Marxists who dwelt on the 
significance of monopoly capitalism retained that same framework. Although they 
no longer argued for a link between value and prices (even in the absence of the 
‘transformation problem’), they still viewed the price of capital in terms of the cost of 
producing its fixed and variable components, irrespective of how such cost were 
determined. Veblen’s framework for capital was radically different in that it anchored 
the pecuniary value of capital not in past or even current prices, but in future prices. 
                                                 
     38 See for instance, Marshall (1920), pp. 647-51, and Schumpeter (1954), pp. 631-37. 
     39 See for instance, Wright (1977), p. 200. Cross-section differences in the organic 
composition of capital created a ‘transformation problem’ of converting input values into input 
prices, but this does not bear on the issue here. The discrepancy between prices and their 
respective labour values was essentially a question of inter-industry redistribution which did 
not impinge on the basic presumption that prices could still be denominated in units of dead 
labour. See for example, Sweezy (1942), ch. 7, and the more recent summary in Catephores 
(1989), pp. 87-106. 
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For Veblen, the current value of tangible capital goods (and certainly of intangible 
ones) was ultimately determined not by what it cost to produce (or institutionalize) 
them, but by what they were expected to generate in profit.40
In a sense, it was Veblen more than the neo-Marxists who succeeded in adapting 
Marx’s view of capital to the new order of business enterprise and monopoly 
capitalism. The ‘backward-looking,’ cost-based interpretation of capital was perhaps 
adequate during the era of so-called competitive capitalism. The early development 
of capitalism occurred within the framework of a money economy. Although the 
separation of business from industry began already in the early stages of capitalism, it 
was initially quite limited in scope and all but negligible in its impact on the 
dominant habits of thinking. Until somewhere around the mid-nineteenth century, 
the business institution of capital was still very much mingled with the industrial 
reality of capital goods and, hence, the value of capital could rightly be seen in terms 
of its cost of production. The circumstances started to change, and rather rapidly, 
with the widespread growth of business corporations in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. The methods of corporation finance converted a money 
economy into system based on credit. The primary significance of this transformation 
arose not from the use of credit to defer payments, but from the impact of credit on 
the institution of ownership. Under the earlier system, the owner-producer operated 
means of production valued in money prices. With the progressive incorporation of 
business activity, however, the archaic ‘captain of industry’ has slowly disappeared 
as the tone-giver, giving rise to the ‘captain of business,’ an absentee owner of 
financial capital whose value was denominated in credit prices. Corporate ownership 
was increasingly created through the extension of credit and, in Veblen’s opinion, it 
was this ‘larger use of credit’ which more than anything affected the dynamic 
development of modern business enterprise. Clearly, if ‘capital’ was to be viewed as 
reflecting the contemporary system of social relationships, its nature as credit could 
no longer be ignored. 
With corporate ownership being increasingly based on credit extensions, capital 
accumulation was becoming more and more a ‘forward-looking’ process. In a 
chronological sense, the accumulation of corporate capital tends to occur not after, 
but before profits are earned. This process becomes quite evident when we examine 
the financial activities of large corporations where there is a more or less complete 
separation between industry and business.41 For firms like General Dynamics, 
                                                 
     40 At a danger of some repetitiveness, it should be emphasized that this view could not be 
reconciled with the neoclassical approach, where the equilibrium between the marginal 
revenue product of capital and the rate of profit assured that the past be ratified by the future. 
For Veblen, there was no such thing as marginal productivity and, in any case, the cost of 
producing a commodity and the price at which it was sold were both business, not industrial 
magnitudes. 
     41 In the case of smaller firms, in which the major owner also operates as an industrial 
entrepreneur, ‘forward-looking’ credit extensions may still be obscured by parallel 
‘backward-looking’ capitalization of cost. 
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Lockheed, Philip Morris, Pepsico, or Chevron, assets tend to expand through the 
issuance of stocks and bonds and these are sold on the basis of a putative increase in 
earning capacity, in other words, on the anticipation of rising profits. To raise cash 
through equity or debt, Chevron need not show a higher profit or even begin drilling. 
An announcement of a new oil project, or heightened expectations for rising 
petroleum prices are usually sufficient to enable new credit extensions; in order to 
borrow on the bond market, Philip Morris and Pepsico do not have to increase their 
market share and profit, but rather persuade investors that they will do so in the 
future; similarly, companies such as General Dynamics or Lockheed do not have to 
actually manufacture and sell new aircraft before they can issue more shares or 
bonds. The very anticipation of a new Pentagon contract or a widespread belief in an 
imminent Middle East conflict could be enough to generate a warm market reception 
for newly issued securities. Of course, in order to constitute a solid basis for new 
capitalization, profit expectations must be ‘institutionalized’ to some extent; in other 
words, they must be widely shared among investors, or they should at least outweigh 
expectations for falling profits. Furthermore, investors must regard the presumed 
increase in profit as sufficiently ‘permanent.’ Yet, regardless of all such 
considerations, at the point of credit extension, these expectations are purely 
hypothetical. In this sense, the accumulation of credit capital is very much a 
‘capitalization of make-believe.’ That is clearly evident from fluctuations in the stock 
and bond markets, where de facto capital prices are largely a matter of ‘folk 
psychology,’ as Veblen (1904, p. 149) already observed, but it is also true for so-
called de jure capitalization as recorded in corporate financial statements. The 
expansion and contraction of corporate liabilities may be slower and less erratic than 
the fluctuations in market quotations, but they, too, ultimately hinge on 
forward-looking suppositions. ‘[I]n the enlightened modern business usage,’ wrote 
Veblen (1904, p. 127, emphasis added), all forms of capital are nothing but 
‘capitalized presumptive earning-capacity.’ 
It should be stressed that none of the forgoing suggests that capital values are 
somehow independent of current realities. Indeed, a prolonged drop in profits is 
likely to make it difficult for IBM to raise new capital, or a decision by ITT to cut its 
dividends could trigger an immediate drop in its share prices. Given this relationship, 
it seems reasonable to ask why does it matter that capitalization looks ‘forward’ to 
profit rather than ‘backward’ to cost? The answer to this question is somewhat subtle. 
Note that current events affect capital values only to the extent to which they bear on 
future expectations. In principle, then, the chronological sequence begins with 
accumulation and only ends with profits. In this sense, the modern methods of 
capitalization turn the process of accumulation into a leading economic force. The 
meaning of ‘leading’ should not be confused with ‘significant’ or ‘primary.’ All 
received economic doctrines emphasize the paramount role of capital accumulation 
but, since they view capital in backward-looking terms, its accumulation necessarily 
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appears as the ‘goal’ or the ‘end result’ of a sequence, rather than its initial step.42 
Under the new order of business, however, capital values are forward-looking and 
accumulation occurs ‘up front.’ With the ‘larger use of credit,’ business activity tends 
not to end but to begin with capital accumulation and that shifts the focus of attention 
from the effect of current economic magnitudes on accumulation, to the impact of 
accumulation on the current development of business and industry. The 
accumulation of capital has two immediate corollaries to which we now turn. 
The first consequence of accumulation is an inflation of the aggregate money value of 
corporate assets.43 This effect could be explicated by considering the two processes 
through which corporate assets tend to expand. The first process involves the direct 
creation of new ownership titles. It occurs when a corporation obtains or 
institutionalizes some intangible assets – and then either distributes new shares or 
bonds to ‘cover’ these intangibles, or lets the price of the outstanding shares and 
bonds rise. This type of accumulation is characteristic of business restructuring. It 
often happens in the initial act of incorporation, when the owners give themselves 
shares to cover the original ‘goodwill’ of their association; it also takes place when a 
merger or an acquisition is believed to have ‘generated’ new intangibles – intangibles 
which could then be covered by higher asset prices or with new stocks and bonds 
allocated to original owners and third parties. This form of capital accumulation 
stems from the creation of ‘new,’ previously-nonexistent assets and hence adds to the 
aggregate value of outstanding corporate assets.  
The second mode of accumulation occurs indirectly, through the transfer of 
ownership titles, whereby the investor advances cash in return for commercial paper 
or some other evidence of debt. From the investor’s perspective, the reduction in 
cash balances is compensated by an increase in corporate securities, leaving his or 
                                                 
     42 In tangible terms, accumulation is said to occur as new means of production are produced 
and added to the existing stock. In value terms, capital is accumulated by adding to the initial 
value of constant and variable capital (or to the value of machines and the wage fund) the 
surplus value (or profit). 
     43 Note that we specifically refer to the aggregate value of corporate assets, rather than to their 
average value. In order to measure the average value of corporate assets we need to divide their 
aggregate value by their total ‘quantity’ and that may not be so easy to do. The conceptual 
difficulty is well illustrated by the attempt of Alchian and Klein (1973) to devise a price index 
for assets. Following the footsteps of Fisher (1911), they assume that the ‘price level of “life”‘ 
must reflect prices of both future as well as current consumption services. In their opinion (p. 
173), this means that ‘[a] correct measure of changes in the nominal money cost of a given 
utility level is a price index for wealth,’ and hence that a truly comprehensive price index 
‘must include asset prices.’ The basic presumption is hence that the ‘quantity’ of assets could 
be counted in terms of some future hedonic services, but then Alchian and Klein are quick to 
admit that these services could not be observed in practice. In other words, that it is impossible 
to determine whether a change in the aggregate value of assets is a pure price change, a pure 
quantity (quality) change, or some mixture of the two. Alchian and Klein point out that the 
concept of ‘quantity’ is also ill-defined in the computing of standard price indices for current 
services, but that, of course, does not solve the problem (see Nitzan, 1989). 
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her total assets unchanged. From the corporation’s point of view, however, the 
transferred cash constitutes a ‘new,’ previously-nonexistent asset (covered with new 
liabilities) and is hence an addition to the aggregate value of outstanding corporate 
assets.  
It is fairly clear, then, that the accumulation of corporate assets creates ‘new 
funds.’ Much like bank deposits – corporate bonds, stocks, bank loans, accounts 
payable and other records of ownership are all pecuniary magnitudes and, when they 
expand, they inflate the aggregate sum of money values existing in the economy.44 
Furthermore, since the accumulation of capital is ‘forward-looking,’ the inflation of 
pecuniary values occurs without a concurrent change in the congeries of goods and 
services, or in the capacity to produce them. It is like diluting water with water. As 
we argue below, the accumulation of capital may or may not lead to changes in 
industrial conditions – but if it does, the change will occur after accumulation has 
taken place.  
Following Veblen, we can hence argue that, ceteris paribus, capital accumulation 
is a purely inflationary process. The meaning of this statement must be interpreted 
with caution. We do not claim here that accumulation raises or will raise the average 
price paid for goods and services (although that may very well happen). Instead, we 
simply state that, at the moment of accumulation, there is an inflation of the 
aggregate sum of pecuniary values without any change in the existing quantity of 
goods and services. 
This line of reasoning may seem reminiscent of the ‘quantity theory,’ but the 
similarity is more apparent than real. While accumulation is always an inflationary 
process, it is never a uniform one and, so, contrary to the monetarist perspective, the 
inflation of capital values is anything but ‘neutral.’ Indeed, the second immediate 
corollary of capital accumulation is redistribution in the control of pecuniary values. The 
expansion of assets occurs either when the corporation takes over another firm, 
                                                 
     44 Bank deposits are records of ownership. They cover part of the capitalized earning 
capacity of a corporation (the bank) and are hence capital for all intent and purposes. There is 
nevertheless a difference between the creation of bank money, which is sometimes restricted 
by reserve requirements, and the expansion of non-bank liabilities, which is potentially 
limitless. To illustrate that there is no technical ceiling on the expansion of such ‘new funds,’ 
consider a hypothetical scenario with only two corporations – AAA Inc. which has $1 million 
worth of machines capitalized in the form of shares, and BBB Inc. which has $1 million in 
cash, also capitalized in the form of shares. The owners of AAA Inc. could use their assets as 
collateral to borrow $1 million in cash from BBB Inc. Following the transaction, the total 
assets of BBB Inc. remain unchanged, but those of AAA Inc. now stand at $2 million. In the 
second stage, BBB Inc. could generate expectations for new profits and use them to sell $1 
million worth of shares to AAA Inc., thereby increasing its own assets to $2 billion. In the 
third step, AAA could create expectations for further increases in future profits and use them 
to sell $1 million in bonds or shares to BBB Inc., raising its assets to $3 million, and so on. 
Since there is no required reserve ratio preventing non-financial corporations from having all 
their assets invested in financial papers, this kind of expansion could (at least in principle) go 
on for ever. 
  
 
 
 
 
56
thereby adding to its own assets what was earlier controlled by the acquired entity, or 
when it increases its assets without there being a corresponding change in the value 
of assets controlled by other companies. In both of these cases, the increase in the 
corporation’s assets is differential, meaning that the corporation now controls a larger 
share out of the aggregate pecuniary values in the economy.45 In other words, the 
accumulation of capital is a process not of inflation, but of inflationary redistribution. It 
involves not merely the expansion of assets but, more profoundly, the restructuring of 
power through the differential revaluation of pecuniary values. 
Given to the foregoing, we can argue that the accumulation of corporate capital 
is purely a business process, consisting of an inflation of assets and a redistribution in 
their control. Yet business is never independent of industry which means that a 
theory for business accumulation must include both its industrial causes and 
industrial consequences. In the United States, ‘forward-looking’ accumulation of 
corporate capital emerged as a result of some fundamental economic changes 
occurring in the later half of the nineteenth century. First was the decline in the pace 
of population growth. Between 1790 and the civil war, the U.S. population grew very 
rapidly, expanding at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent. The conquering of the 
western ‘frontier’ brought a sharp drop in that rate. From the civil war until the turn 
of the twentieth century, the population expanded at an average rate of only 2.2 per 
annum, and that fell even further, to 1.6 percent, between the turn of the century and 
the onset of the Great Depression.46 The second significant development occurring in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century was the rapid expansion of ‘industrial arts’ 
and the consequent surge in productivity growth. During the 1860s, there was still a 
                                                 
     45 To illustrate both forms of redistribution, consider the 1986 takeover of RCA by General 
Electric. (Details are from Moody’s Industrial Manuals, ‘General Electric Company,’ 1986, Vol. 
1, pp. 348-64.) To finance the deal, General Electric borrowed $5.4 billion, thereby 
augmenting both its total assets and its total liabilities by a corresponding sum. The borrowing 
brought no parallel increase in corporate assets elsewhere in the economy and hence raised the 
relative share of General Electric in the aggregate value of outstanding assets. Next, General 
Electric paid $6.4 billion (the borrowed funds plus $1 billion of its own cash) to acquire all of 
RCA’s outstanding stocks from its current shareholders. This action eliminated RCA as a 
going concern and erased the value of its shares from the economy’s balance sheet. If we 
stopped at this point, it might have appeared as if General Electric was simply transferring 
values from its own creditors to the shareholders of RCA, thereby leaving the aggregate value 
of outstanding assets more or less intact. That is not what happened, however. The 
elimination of RCA as a going concern redistributed all of its assets – about $6.7 billion – to 
General Electric, but the sum added to General electric’s balance sheet was $2.7 billion larger 
than the $6.7 billion erased from the RCA accounts! The reason was that what General 
Electric paid was deemed to be higher than the ‘fair market value’ of RCA’s shares. In other 
words, the acquisition was seen as creating $2.7 billion worth of ‘goodwill’ which were duly 
added to the assets of General Electric. All in all, the accumulation of $9.4 billion by General 
Electric involved a direct reshuffling of $6.7 billion worth of existing assets previously 
controlled by RCA, and a creation of an additional $2.7 billion worth of new assets. 
     46 Computed from data published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, 1975, Part 1, Series A2, p. 8. 
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substantial positive gap between the rates of growth of population and productivity. 
In manufacturing, for example, labour productivity rose at an average annual rate of 
only 0.5 percent, while the population expanded at an average annual rate of 2.7 
percent. This gap was closing very rapidly, however. In the 1870s, the rate of 
population growth declined to 2.6, while productivity growth almost doubled, to 0.9 
percent. Then, during the 1880s, while the population continued to grow at an 
annual rate of 2.6 percent, productivity growth more than doubled again, to 2.1 
percent. Finally, during 1890s, when the rate of population growth dropped to 2.1 
percent, the gap turned negative because productivity was now expanding even 
faster, at 2.3 percent.47 According to Veblen, the interaction of these parallel 
processes had a decisive impact on the nature of business institutions. Until the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, markets (both domestic and foreign) tended to expand 
faster than productive capacity and the main concern of individual firms was how to 
satisfy the growing demand for their goods: 
 
[D]uring all that period which can properly be called the era of free 
competition the industrial system never reached such a pitch of efficiency 
that it could properly be called inordinately productive; that is to say, 
production was not at that time continually in danger of outrunning the 
capacity of the market. . . . The growth of population and the growing 
extension of trade into foreign parts afforded an outlet for an ever increasing 
production of goods, at reasonably profitable prices, that is to say at 
increasingly profitable prices. So that business considerations during that 
time called for no vigilant restriction output, on the whole; and the sagacity 
of the captain of industry was therefore habitually directed to a cheap and 
large output of goods. . . . (1923, pp. 72-3) 
 
The situation started to change toward the end of the nineteenth century. The post 
civil-war period witnessed an unprecedented increase in the use of new raw 
materials, in the development and assimilation of innovations and new production 
techniques and in the diversity of products – all of which contributed to a notable 
acceleration in the expansion in productive capacity. On the other hand, the decline 
in population growth significantly reduced the growth of demand. This combination 
of rising productivity growth and slower increases in population meant that, from a 
business perspective, the industrial system became ‘inordinately productive.’ If the 
earlier pattern of competitive production were to continue, industry would tend to 
                                                 
     47 The figures for population growth are from Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1970, 1975, Part 1, Series A7, p. 8. Data on productivity growth are based on the 
Frickey Index for manufacturing Production, published in Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Colonial Times to 1970, 1975, Part 2, Series P17, p. 667, and on the number of production 
workers in manufacturing establishments, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 
its Census of Manufacturing, 1982, Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics, pp. 1-2. 
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generate much more output that what could be sold at profitable prices. In other 
words, it would bring business enterprise to an end. 
The ‘unruly’ development of the machine process threatened to undermine the 
very control of industry by business. If until the latter part of the nineteenth century 
profits arose from the private ownership of ‘scarce’ industrial capacity, from that 
period onward, business was faced with a chronic predicament of ‘excess’ capacity. 
The industrial apparatus was still privately owned, but its was no longer scarce, at 
least not in relation to what could be sold under prevailing conditions. In order to 
maintain profitability, there was now a constant need to reestablish scarcity, either by 
raising sales above capacity, or by curtailing capacity to ‘what the market could 
bear.’ The difficulty for business was that a shift toward such ‘institutional’ scarcity 
could not be accomplished when firms acted at cross purposes. An increase in 
production might be profitable for one or several firms only insofar as all other firms 
did not try to do the same thing. Similarly, there was no point in curtailing your own 
capacity if other businesses maintained or increased theirs. Whereas firms previously 
acted as competitive producers in an ‘open’ market, they now had to struggle as 
competitive sellers in a ‘closed’ market and, under these circumstances, atomistic 
competition was a sure way for extinction. Excess capacity was an aggregate problem 
and hence could be solved only through concerted action. According to Veblen (and 
many others since then), it was this persistent need for collective restriction of output 
which underlies the new order of business combinations.48 
Large scale coordination of business activity first emerged in the United States 
around the 1870s. It started with the early organization of national business and 
trade associations, continued with the formation of trusts and reached its 
institutional maturity with the rise of ‘big business’ during the first wave of mergers 
and acquisitions extending between the late 1880s and the early 1900s.49 By the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the institutional dynamics of U.S. business were 
more or less thoroughly transformed from unregulated competition to oligopolistic 
interaction. The transformation did not make business less ‘competitive’ as firms 
were still seeking, perhaps more than ever before, to beat the average and outperform 
their rivals. The fundamental change was rather in the mode of competition. Instead 
of pursuing their goals by means of individual competition, firms were continuously 
drawn into collective action and their struggle was increasingly carried through 
business coalitions. 
                                                 
     48 The largest combination of its time – the 1901 formation of U.S. Steel – was explicitly 
motivated by the spectre of excess capacity, as were many other mergers at the time (see Ross 
and Scherer, 1990, p. 155 and Chandler, 1959, p. 285). Even when there was no immediate 
danger of excessive output, business combination facilitated industrial rationalization when 
the need eventually arose. 
     49 On the beginning of ‘big business’ in the United States, see Chandler (1959). Extensive 
discussions of the early merger movement could be found in Markham (1955), Nelson (1959) 
and Lamoreaux (1985). Additional reviews and selected bibliographies are given in Scherer 
and Ross (1990), ch. 5, and in Bowring (1986), ch. 3. 
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The most significant development enabling the formation of such coalitions was 
the emergence of corporations as the common form of business organization. 
Business combinations were initially formed through loose associations, pools and 
trusts, but these were often unstable and not very successful.50 As Olson (1965 and 
1982) convincingly argued, collective action is usually difficult and often impossible 
for large groups and an excessive number of firms was indeed a primary factor 
contributing to the relative fragility of these early combinations. There was hence a 
pressing need to reduce the number of firms and the most effective way to do so was 
through the merging of existing companies into larger ones.51 Mergers, however, 
were not only structural transformations, but also financial transactions. They 
involved the buying and selling of capital which meant that firms had to have a 
pecuniary value. Capital had to become ‘vendible’ and that was achieved through the 
widespread incorporation of business firms, the rapid development of stock and bond 
markets and the growing use of credit instruments during the final decade of the 
nineteenth century. It was in that period that the separation of business from industry 
was finally completed, with investors becoming absentee owners of ‘forward-looking’ 
capital values. 
These transformations set a qualitative pattern which characterized the dynamic 
interaction between business and industry throughout the entire twentieth century. 
By and large, industrial productivity continued to expand much faster than ‘what the 
market could bear,’ making excess capacity a chronic business problem. If business 
enterprise were to survive, the ‘scarcity’ of capital goods had to be continuously 
reestablished, which meant that the only ‘permanent’ solution was a ceaseless 
restructuring of business institutions. The problem was and remained an aggregate 
one, and so business restructuring continued to involve the formation and 
reformation of business coalitions. Given that the effectiveness of collective action is 
negatively related to the number of participating units and positively related to their 
average size, the incentive for mergers in fact tended to increase with the process of 
corporate concentration and the progressive increase in corporate size. Mergers were 
financial transactions of credit expansion and so, ever since the first major 
restructuring of U.S. business, they were unfolding together with the expansion of 
credit and the accumulation of corporate capital. 
Note that in identifying this historical pattern we do not claim that it stemmed 
from some iron ‘laws of motion.’ The new order of large-scale industry and big 
business was driven by the antagonistic interaction between the ‘instinct of 
                                                 
     50 See for example Chandler (1977), pp. 317-18, Cochran and Miller (1961), pp. 140-46. 
     51 This rationale for the growth of large firms differs from the traditional emphasis on the 
technological benefits of large scale. Indeed, according to different evidence analyzed by 
Edwards (1979, pp. 217-24), the growth of firm size after the turn of the century generally 
exceeded the need for technical efficiency. Furthermore, even in the presence of economies of 
scale, the ultimate purpose of corporate mergers was not to increase, but limit industrial 
activity. 
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workmanship’ and the quest for profit, but the outcome arising from this interaction 
was in no way ‘inevitable.’ The economic history of the twentieth century was 
dominated not by atomistic units of negligible size, but by giant corporations and 
massive coalitions. This meant that the broad forces of industry and business 
operated not through the abstract gestures of an ‘invisible hand,’ but rather through 
the singular actions or inaction of particular corporate groups. The question now was 
not only whether business needed to reestablish scarcity, but also the extent to which 
it succeeded in doing so and, under the new circumstance of differential power 
relations, that question could have no ‘deterministic’ answer. 
The significance of this view becomes clearer when illustrated with specific 
examples. Consider first the process of industrial development and the efforts of 
corporate coalitions to arrest that process to their own ends, namely, for the purpose 
of maintaining and, if possible, increasing the profits of their constituent members. 
For example, steel profits in the United States were affected by diverse factors such 
as the dramatic improvements in the production of steel, the formation of U.S. Steel 
Corporation, the collusive ‘Gary dinners’ and the recent challenge from Korean steel 
producers. Yet the fact that these industrial and business developments have taken 
place does not necessarily mean they were ‘inevitable.’ Had the Bessemer process not 
been invented, had Carnegie refused Morgan’s merger offers, had collusive pricing 
practices been prosecuted, or had the Koreans been less successful with their cost 
cutting – steel profits were sure to have been drastically different from what they 
were. The same could be said on the experience of the oil business. The development 
of petroleum refining methods by Silliman, the discovery of major oil fields in 
Pennsylvania, and the growing energy requirements were not more inevitable than 
the rapid concentration of the oil industry, the dynamic interaction between large oil 
companies and oil-producing countries, and the political and military events in the 
Middle East – which have all affected the shifting fortunes of the large petroleum 
companies. Similarly, the development of the internal combustion engine and the 
Ford assembly line were not inescapable, and neither were the subsequent 
consolidation of the automobile oligopoly, the failure of General Motors to raise $3 
million in 1908 and $8 million in 1909 to acquire the Ford Company, or the recent 
rise of foreign automobile companies. Finally, the invention of the airplane and 
improvements in aviation technology were not necessary historical developments 
and the same could be said on the formation of a three-firm oligopoly in the civilian 
aircraft industry, or on the looming challenge from Japanese conglomerates. 
Similar indeterminacy prevails when we consider the record of business 
coalitions in combating excess capacity by augmenting demand for their products. 
Since the turn of the century, sales increases were achieved by two principal 
strategies – either through advertisement, repackaging, remodelling and other 
methods of salesmanship designed to affect consumer and business purchases, or by 
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less overt practices aimed at raising government spending.52 These strategies have not 
been always successful, however. In an oligopolistic situation, the effect of increases 
in total selling expenditures on the aggregate profits of the group is positive only up 
to a certain ‘optimal’ level, after which it becomes negative. Individual oligopolies 
may prefer that their group gravitates toward such ‘optimal’ levels, but there is no 
reason to assume that they will necessarily succeed in doing so. The ability to limit 
excessive selling expenditures depends not only on what is desired, but also on what 
is feasible, and that may hinge on the internal cohesiveness of the oligopolistic group 
and its capacity for collective action. The inability to reach mutual understanding in 
this area is reflected in the extent to which selling cost is institutionalized as a 
‘necessary’ cost of doing business.53 The automobile companies in the Unites States, 
for instance, have been spending considerable amounts on annual model changes – 
more than 25 percent of the purchase price according to a famous study by Fisher, 
Grilliches and Kaysen (1962) – and it is highly doubtful that these promotional 
spending have raised sales let alone profits by a comparable amount. The failure of 
the automobile oligopoly to restrict annual remodelling has probably reduced its 
aggregate profits, but that impact was blurred because the expenditures on 
remodelling were increasingly seen as a necessary cost of production.  
The significance of collective action is also apparent when we examine the 
ability of corporations to affect governmental demand for their product. For 
example, after the Vietnam War, there evolved in the United Sates an ‘armament 
core’ of large corporations which obtained spectacular increases in profits by 
augmenting their arms sales to the U.S. government and to foreign countries.54 The 
present structure of this coalition and its influence on domestic and foreign 
government policies may no longer be sufficient, however, to prevent decreases in 
military spending. Given the deepening fiscal crisis in the United States and the end 
of the cold war, the prosperity of these firms will now depend either on their ability 
to prevent arms sales from falling, or on their capacity to raise profit margins – both 
of which may require a further consolidation of their coalition. These contingencies 
meant that the future fate of the ‘armament core’ and the related course of future 
military spending are not really ‘predictable’ in any scientific sense. Both depend on 
the extent and effectiveness of future institutional changes and these are simply not 
‘written in the cards.’ With this ‘historical indeterminacy’ in mind, we could finally 
turn to assess the interrelated dynamics of distributional coalitions and stagflation. 
                                                 
     52 Veblen was probably the first to identify the significance such ‘extra’ spending and their 
effect on the emergence of ‘institutionalized waste.’ The role of wasteful expenditures under 
monopoly capitalism was examined and debated mainly by neo-Marxist writers such as 
Kalecki (1933), Sweezy (1942), Steindl (1952) Baran and Sweezy (1966), Magdoff and Sweezy 
(1983 and 1985) and Szlajfer (1984a and 1984b).  
     53 On the view of selling expenditures as a necessary cost of production, see for example 
Veblen (1923) ch. 11 and Baran and Sweezy (1966) ch. 5. 
     54 On the emergence and activities of the ‘armament core,’ see Bichler et al., (1989), Nitzan et 
al. (1989) and Rowley, et al. (1989). 
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6. Toward a Dynamic Theory of Distributional Coalitions and Stagflation 
 
The relationship between the processes of inflation and stagnation on the one hand, 
and the institutional restructuring of business coalitions on the other, could be 
presented in the form of three related hypotheses. 
(1) Following Veblen, we have argued that the appropriation of profits depends 
on the strategic control of industrial activity for business ends. The control of 
industry by business is possible because the capital goods needed for the cooperative 
process of production are held under individual ownership. The businessman has the 
vested right to curtail industrial production, and it is this institutional power to inflict 
‘scarcity’ which gives capital goods their pecuniary value. The institutional basis of 
‘scarcity’ remains obscure as long as the population grows faster than industrial 
productivity. Under such circumstances, the physical capacity to produce falls short 
of market requirements, making ‘scarcity’ look like a natural barrier imposed by 
limited resources. Profits, though, are accrued not because there are not enough 
capital goods, but because business owners have the right to withdraw the industrial 
services of such goods. The right to ‘sabotage’ need not always be exercised, however. 
With markets growing faster than productivity, the latent threat of a ‘hold-down’ is 
usually sufficient to allow owners to ‘do business on their own terms’; that is, to earn 
a profit even though industry is producing at full capacity. All of this changes with 
large-scale industry, which tends to increase productivity much faster than the pace 
of population growth. Under this new situation, a failure to actually exercise the 
‘right for sabotage’ may diminish ‘scarcity’ to the point of zero or negative profits. To 
prevent that from happening, industrial activity must be curtailed below its 
maximum potential capacity, which in turn implies that some ‘means of production’ 
must remain industrially idle. In other words, under the normal conditions of 
large-scale industry, the earning of business profits requires that there be an ‘excess 
industrial capacity’ of unemployed labour, resources and technology. This 
requirement leads us to our first tentative hypothesis, namely, that under ‘mature’ 
capitalism, business prosperity necessitates industrial stagnation.55 Note that this logic says 
                                                 
     55 It should be emphasized that we use ‘stagnation’ here only in the relative sense of 
under-capacity utilization, with full capacity delineated by technological rather than business 
constraints. Consequently, the extent to which industry stagnates below its full potential need 
not be related to the pace of growth of industrial output. To illustrate this argument using 
conventional (if objectionable) categories, let capacity C be given by the product of total 
available inputs N and total input productivity q, such that C = N ⋅ q. Capacity utilization CU 
could then be defined as the ratio of output Q to capacity, so CU = Q / C, or CU = Q / (N ⋅ q). 
From this last equation, it is clear that, for a given value of N, capacity utilization is positively 
related to output and negatively related to total input productivity. For instance, if, when 
industry operates at 70 percent of its capacity, there is a 6 percent increase in output (due to 
higher utilization of inputs) coupled with an 8 percent increase in productivity, then capacity 
utilization will, by definition, fall by 1.85 percent to 68.7 percent. On the other hand, if output 
grows at a rate of only 5 percent but productivity rises at 3 percent, then there must be an 
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nothing on the specific relationship existing between business prosperity and 
industrial stagnation which need be neither linear nor stationary. Moreover, it does 
not even imply that industry must stagnate. All it says is that, if the technical capacity 
to produce expands faster than market requirements, and if business enterprise 
nevertheless prospers, than such prosperity could occur only with industry stagnating 
below its full productive potential. 
(2) The strategic limitation of industrial activity could be implemented only 
through successful business cooperation, which in turn requires that business activity 
be dominated by sufficiently large coalitions. Furthermore, to the extent that 
productivity growth continuously outstrips the growth of the market, there is a 
constant need for further limitations of industry, which is easiest to achieve through 
additional business concentration. The process of concentration tends both to reduce 
the number of large firms and to increase their relative size, enabling a more effective 
cooperation between and among business coalitions. These considerations lead to 
our second tentative hypothesis – namely, that there exists a significant relationship 
between the extent of industrial stagnation on the one hand, and the process of business 
concentration and the consolidation of large business coalitions on the other. Again, there is 
nothing immanent in these developments. We do not argue that industrial or 
aggregate concentration ratios have to rise, or that business coalitions must become 
more effective, but rather that, if business continues to prosper despite the excessive 
growth of industrial capacity, such prosperity is likely to occur through an ongoing 
process of corporate concentration and a progressive consolidation of corporate 
coalitions. 
(3) The ‘success’ of business cooperation has a direct bearing on the process of 
capital accumulation. The extent to which corporate concentration and the 
strengthening of corporate coalitions increase expected profits is promptly reflected 
in the capitalization of affected groups. An increase in the anticipated level of profits 
raises the expected rate of profit on current capitalization above the prevailing 
‘normal’ rate of return (adjusted for ‘risk’), thus justifying a recapitalization. The 
recapitalization usually occurs through a combined increase in both the number and 
average market value of outstanding stocks, bonds and other commercial papers 
which, together, lead to an inflation in the aggregate value of corporate assets. 
Hence, our third tentative hypothesis is that, under the new order of business 
enterprise, the tendency toward industrial stagnation is accompanied by a progressive asset 
inflation; in other words, that stagnation and inflation tend to appear together as 
‘stagflation.’ The meaning of stagflation here differs from conventional uses of this 
term. It refers not to the quantity and prices of produced goods and services, but 
rather to the relative utilization of industrial capacity and to the aggregate nominal 
                                                                                                                         
increase of 1.94 percent in capacity utilization to 71.4 percent. The faster output growth in the 
first case is associated with deepening stagnation, while the slower growth in the second case 
is accompanied by lessening stagnation. 
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values of outstanding records of ownership. Moreover, there is no ‘unique’ 
relationship between the tendency toward ‘stagflation’ of under-capacity utilization 
and asset inflation on the one hand, and the temporal movements of output and 
prices on the other. Attempts to curtail industrial activity below its full capacity will 
reduce the growth of output below what it would otherwise be; but in the dynamic 
context of rising productivity, that need not always result in falling or even 
stagnating output. Similarly, the inflation in asset values will tend to raise the 
aggregate turnover and hence the overall value of sales but, if aggregate output rises 
even faster, asset inflation need not be associated with commodity price inflation. 
Yet, whether or not we can identify a stationary statistical relationship here, it is 
nevertheless clear that, from a causal perspective, ‘stagflation’ of under-capacity 
utilization and asset inflation tends to reduce output growth and increase price 
inflation. 
To summarize, our three tentative hypotheses suggest: (1) that in a ‘mature’ 
capitalist economy, business prosperity necessitates industrial stagnation; (2) that the 
extent of industrial stagnation is affected by the process of business concentration 
and the consolidation of large business coalitions; and (3) that since business 
restructuring occurs through capital accumulation, the tendency toward industrial 
stagnation is accompanied by a progressive asset inflation – or, in other words, that 
stagnation and inflation tend to appear together as ‘stagflation.’  
Taken together, these three tentative hypotheses enable us to approach the 
evolution of modern capitalism as a dynamic, double-sided process. On the 
disaggregate level, there is a relentless process of business restructuring, involving 
continuous changes in corporate concentration and in the organization of corporate 
coalitions. The differential effect of this restructuring on profitability is revealed on 
the aggregate level in the form ‘stagflation.’ We can hence view the disaggregate 
restructuring and the aggregate stagflation as two sides of the same process of capital 
accumulation. Seen from a long-term perspective, the ongoing consolidation of 
business power generates rising expectations for profits which in turn fuel the 
accumulation of capital. In this way, the pattern of business restructuring is 
‘imprinted’ on the annals of accumulation through the differential recapitalization of 
assets. At the same time, the extent to which corporate restructuring generates higher 
profit expectations depends on both the limitation of industry and the related 
inflation of assets and sales, which means that capital is accumulated by capitalizing 
‘stagflation’ tendencies. 
This ‘stagflationary restructuring’ could be understood only as a dynamic process. 
It is not business power per se, but rather changes in that power which generate 
stagflation. To explore the institutional roots of stagflation, we have to examine not 
only the broad facets of structure, but most importantly, the continuous process of 
restructuring. Stagflation requires that markets be dominated by oligopolies and 
business coalitions, but the mere existence of these institutions is still insufficient to 
explain the temporal nature of industrial stagnation and asset inflation. It is the 
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continuous process of institutional change which enables business to restrain the ever 
increasing productivity of industry and to recapitalize this industrial limitation 
through an inflationary accumulation of capital. 
The dynamic essence of ‘stagflationary restructuring’ becomes evident when we 
take a bird’s eye view on the evolution of U.S. business since the mid nineteenth 
century.56 The emergence of the new order of business enterprise was characterized 
by severe instability. Initially, the increasing use of loan credit brought frequent and 
violent credit cycles. The onset of a business boom raised profit expectations, 
inducing both borrowers and lender toward further credit extensions which, in turn, 
tended to fuel inflation and further credit extensions. However, given the competitive 
nature of production, the inflation of asset values was not accompanied by a 
comparable increase in profits, leading to an eventual decline in the rate of return, an 
immanent panic and a downward rerating of capital values. The situation changed 
with the dual emergence of large-scale industry and big business. The progressive 
formation of business coalitions and the expanding capitalization of their rising 
profits helped rationalize the control of both industry and credit. There was a 
widespread proliferation of oligopolistic practices based on price leadership and a 
‘target’ rates of return, which tended to stabilize the flow of profits. On the other 
hand, the incidence of unruly speculative booms was greatly reduced by the 
coordinated actions of the large financial institutions and Federal Reserve Board. As 
a result of these qualitative transformations, the violent cycles of inflationary booms 
and deflationary busts gave way to chronic industrial stagnation coupled with a 
persistent inflation of assets. These new ‘stagflationary’ circumstances were not 
‘inevitable.’ They reflected the ongoing processes of business concentration and 
consolidation of corporate coalitions, and there was no ‘iron law’ which guaranteed 
the success (or even continuation) of such restructuring. But while the new order of 
‘big business’ did not ascertain an ongoing ‘stagflationary restructuring,’ it was 
nevertheless highly conducive to this outcome. In particular, it mobilized the 
differential use of credit capital which tended to augment the relative power of big 
business, thus intensifying the related processes of stagflation and corporate 
restructuring. 
Taken in the aggregate, the overall expansion of credit instruments need not 
reflect changes in business power. A universal inflation in the prices of all 
commodities may justify a larger capitalization of credit, even in the absence of any 
increase in the overall ‘degree of monopoly’ or any changes in the distribution of 
business power. But the emergence of big business introduced an inherent inequality 
in business power and that had a profound effect on the significance of credit for the 
process of restructuring. For most corporations, particularly smaller firms which are 
not organized for collective action, credit is essential in order to meet the expanding 
requirements for working capital. Given the non-cooperative environment in which 
                                                 
     56 For more on these transformations, see Veblen (1904), ch. 7, and (1923) ch. 12. 
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such firms operate, the usual basis supporting these credit extensions is not a 
differential application of industrial ‘sabotage,’ but simply the overall inflation in 
commodity prices and the resulting rise in nominal profits. For the larger 
corporations, however, the situation is radically different. Here, credit extensions are 
based not only on the overall rate of price inflation, but also on the ability of such 
firms to alter the institutional circumstances within which they operate. Unlike the 
smaller firms for which credit extensions are merely a response to changing 
conditions, for the big corporations, the accumulation of credit obligations is an 
evidence of an institutional initiative toward changing these conditions. Furthermore, 
the progressive capitalization of profit expectations by large firms tends to become 
much like a ‘self-fulfilling’ prophecy.  
From a technical perspective, capital accumulation is indeed a ‘forward-looking’ 
process which should be reversed if the expectations on which it was based prove to 
be false. The likelihood of such negative rerating, however, tends to diminish with 
the growth of corporations and the consolidation of their coalitions. First, the 
increased interdependency between large lenders and borrowers heightens their sense 
of ‘common cause’ and increases their willingness to act together toward preventing 
any serious financial failure – either through further credit extensions to a 
beleaguered corporation, or through a takeover in which the existing capitalization is 
maintained by a process of merger. Second, with the growth of large corporations, 
the spectre of a major bankruptcy tends to become politically intolerable, thus 
making governments and central bankers more inclined to ‘intervene’ in serious 
cases. Furthermore, it is precisely the large corporations which have the political 
leverage to induce such ‘bailouts.’57 Thus, for the largest firms, the extension of loan 
credit is not only an anticipation of increased earning capacity, but also a most 
powerful weapon in realizing that increase. This strategic use of credit is more or less 
limited to large firms and its effectiveness tends to increase with corporate size – two 
realities which together mean that the larger use of credit is, in itself, a catalyst for 
‘stagflationary restructuring.’58 
                                                 
     57 The government role could be ‘overt,’ as in the bailouts of Chrysler during the early 1980s, 
of Continental Illinois in 1984, and of the savings and loans industry since the late 1980s; or it 
could be ‘covert,’ for example, in the form of extended government contracts or tax savings to 
a large defence contractor. 
     58 Writing before the new order of business enterprise had begun, Marx (1906, Vol. 1, p. 687) 
was prophetic in his observations about the role of credit in corporate restructuring: ‘In its 
beginning, the credit system sneaks in as a modest helper of accumulation and draws by 
invisible threads the money resources scattered all over the surface of society into the hands of 
individual or associated capitalists. But soon it becomes a new and formidable weapon in the 
competitive struggle, and finally it transforms itself into an immense social mechanism for the 
centralization of capitals.’ 
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These considerations are highly important because the differential accumulation 
of credit seems to be rooted in the competitive essence of business enterprise.59 The 
accumulation of assets usually offers a corporation a differential advantage vis à vis 
rivals who fail to augment their assets or those who expand at a slower pace. The 
advantage is clearly evident under the ‘normal’ circumstances of rising markets, 
when the cost of new capital is commonly lower than the additional profits it is 
expected to generate, but the drive to accumulate exists even in the absence of such 
apparent monetary gains. The relative magnitude of a corporation’s assets is of such 
paramount importance in the competitive struggle for business, that firms may often 
feel compelled to increase their overall size, even when the expected addition to 
profit does not exceed and sometimes falls below the cost of added capital. In other 
words, ‘under the régime of competitive business whatever is generally advantageous 
becomes a necessity for all competitors’ and, so, ‘[s]peaking broadly, recourse to 
credit becomes the general practice, the regular course of competitive business 
management. . . .’ (1904, pp. 96-7).60 
Stagflation, then, is driven not only by the relentless progress of industrial 
productivity, but also by the compelling need to accumulate credit capital, and these 
two tendencies tend to reinforce each other. The ultimate yardstick for business 
success is the differential pace of capital accumulation. A faster accumulation 
requires an increasingly effective administration of differential industrial sabotage 
which is, in turn, facilitated or ‘validated’ by the differential inflation of credit. From 
this perspective, the accumulation of corporate assets and, hence, the inflation and 
redistribution of pecuniary values, are no more accidental than the tendency for 
chronic industrial stagnation. Both are intrinsic to the new order of large-scale 
industry and corporate finance and tend to intensify with the progressive growth of 
‘big business’ and consolidation of corporate coalitions. 
These arguments imply that the structural roots of stagflation should be traced 
not to the accumulation of distributional coalitions in general, as suggested by Olson, 
but specifically to the emergence and consolidation of business coalitions. Recall that 
Olson made no fundamental distinction between the distributional activities of 
labour and business coalitions, and that he identified no significant difference in their 
macroeconomic impact. If we adopt Veblen’s framework, however, we can no longer 
treat labour unions and business coalitions in the same way. It is true, wrote Veblen 
                                                 
     59 Again, ‘competitiveness’ here refers to the elemental drive for differential gain which exists 
irrespective of business cooperation (see Section 4). 
     60 The competitive need for new capital is so strong that it continues to exert pressure even 
during a business stagnation. As Veblen (1923, pp. 94-5) acutely observed, despite the severe 
recession following the Armistice of 1918, ‘the generality of business concerns are and have all 
this time been seeking additional funds, but evidently not to increase the output of goods, since 
neither the equipment controlled by these concerns nor the available man-power are or have 
been employed more than one-half their capacity.’ This tendency is still evident in our 
contemporary economy, where despite considerable unused capacity, the quest for new funds 
continues unabated. 
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(1923, pp. 296-98), that, with the evolution of business enterprise, both employers 
and workers have increasingly come to realize that ‘the sole decisive argument on 
either side is a refusal to go on’ and, so, on the face of it, trade unions appear to 
follow standard business tactics of ‘mutual defeat.’ Yet, beyond this apparent 
similarity there lie some critical differences in both the modus operandi and eventual 
consequences of the two types of coalitions. 
First, unlike the goals of business, not all the aims of organized labour could be 
denominated in pecuniary terms. To increase profits and accumulate assets, a 
business coalition requires that industry stagnates below its full capacity, but the 
stagnation itself is not a matter for business concern. Labour unions, on the other 
hand, are caught in an uncomfortable dilemma, for they seek not only higher wages, 
but also secured employment.61 Veblen also pointed out to a significant sentimental 
difference that partially inhibits the business-like behaviour of labour unions. Caught 
in their ‘instinct of workmanship,’ he wrote (1923, p. 295), ‘[t]heir spiritual 
complexion is not yet fully commercialized, even though the great body of them may 
already have begun to realize that sabotage is the beginning of wisdom in industrial 
business. They may already believe it with their head, but they do not yet know it 
with their heart.’ 
A second difference between labour unions and business coalitions concerns 
their mode of organization. Unlike business cooperation, the collective action of 
workers must be overt. Since labour unions can achieve their goals only through a 
process of bargaining, both the organization of a labour union and its subsequent 
activities are necessarily open to public and legal examination. Business activity, on 
the other hand, is essentially unilateral. The right to set prices and output levels is 
conferred by the cannons of private property. It requires no consent from workers or 
consumers and, in general, is not subject to legal scrutiny. In this context, collective 
business action could remain tacit and, indeed, with the exception of official cartels, 
most business coalitions have no de jure existence. In fact, the most obvious form of 
business cooperation – the corporation itself – is normally not considered to be 
institution of collective action.  
The third and perhaps most important difference between labour and business 
coalitions stems from the institutionalization of their distributional power. The 
successful achievement of wage increases by a labour union would not usually affect 
the future ability of that union to obtain additional wage increases, or even to 
maintain current wage levels. For a business coalition, on the other hand, differential 
                                                 
     61 ‘Despite decades in which unions have been part of the economic scene,’ write Freeman 
and Medoff (1984, p. 6), ‘economists lack an accepted maximizing theory of union behavior 
that would predict the results of bargaining within the union over wage goals. Under some 
circumstances a union may seek a high wage at the cost of employment; under others, it may 
be more moderate in its wage demands to preserve jobs. This union concern is quite distinct 
from the worries of a monopolist, whose sole goal is to maximize profits, regardless of what 
happens to the number of units sold.’ 
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increases in profits are promptly capitalized. In other words, unlike labour coalitions, 
the success of corporate coalitions allows them to increase their financial leverage 
and to further augment their distributional power.  
This last difference helps to resolve a major weakness in the way in which Olson 
approached the dynamic accumulation of distributional coalitions. His attempt to 
formulate a ‘universal’ theory which would explain the rise and decline of nations 
across time and place made it difficult to devise a uniform criterion for coalition 
power. In the absence of such a common gauge, Olson used the number of coalitions 
as a proxy for their aggregate economic significance, which amounted to assuming 
that all coalitions were ‘equal’ and, of course, biased his discussion toward overt 
labour coalitions and away from covert business coalitions.62 If we agree to restrict 
our analysis only to mature capitalism, however, we do not have to assume that all 
coalitions are alike, or to use membership counts as a proxy for coalition strength. In 
the case of business coalitions, the most straightforward index for distributional 
power is not the number of participants, but rather the differential financial 
performance of coalition members. In fact, for business coalitions, a decline in the 
number of firms is often associated with an increase, not a decrease in distributional 
power. 
There are also substantial differences between the impacts that labour and 
business coalitions have on the process of stagflation. First, given that wages are a 
cost of production, the power of organized labour is ultimately limited by the power 
of organized business. In other words, the extent to which unions limit industrial 
activity and in that way lead to higher prices depends on the distributional power of 
the corporations for which union members work. There is no similar dependency for 
corporate coalitions. Their profits are often related to the overall consumption of 
wage earners, but they rarely depend on the purchasing power of their own workers. 
We could hence argue that the stagflationary effect of labour unions is constrained by 
the stagflationary effect of corporate coalitions. Second, in the context of an 
‘inordinately’ productive industry, business prosperity necessitates a process 
‘stagflationary restructuring’ of corporate coalitions, but there is no similar 
imperative requiring the growth and consolidation of labour unions. Under the new 
order of business enterprise, a failure to continuously restructure the business control 
of industry will eventually eliminate profits and bring capitalism to a standstill, but 
the failure of workers to repeatedly reorganize their collective action will lead to no 
comparable cataclysm. This leads us to the third difference – between the ‘static’ 
impact of labour unions and the ‘dynamic’ effect of corporate coalitions. Unlike 
Olson, Veblen differentiated between the aims of labour and the goals of business. 
Following Marx, he identified well being as the ultimate purpose of wage labour, 
which meant that the goals of organized labour could be denominated in terms of 
                                                 
     62 In cases where even the number of official coalitions was unknown, Olson resorted to time 
as an index approximating the increasing number (and hence power) of the (unknown) 
coalitions. 
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levels. Workers were interested in higher wage levels, which, under certain 
circumstances, may lead to higher price levels and lower levels of output. Business, 
on the other hand, strove not for higher ‘purchasing power,’ but for differential 
pecuniary gain. Consequently, the target of business coalitions was not high profits, 
but ever-increasing profits, which in turn implied not high prices and low output, but 
inflation and persisting stagnation.63 
The views and analyses examined in this essay point to a pressing need to 
redefine our theoretical and empirical programme for the study of stagflation. We 
hope to develop such programme in our future research. 
                                                 
     63 It should be emphasized that we talk here not about the subjective preferences of 
individuals, but the objective pressures imposed on distributional coalitions. Many workers 
would obviously like to see their consumption rising continuously, while some businessmen 
may lose sight of what ‘makes them run’; but, in both cases, their actions would still be 
dictated by the objective circumstances – the static circulation of labour power in the first case, 
and the dynamic requirements for differential business performance in the second. 
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